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Abstract  
This thesis is comprised of three papers, each making a distinctive theoretical and 
empirical contribution to our understanding of interest representation within the 
European Parliament (EP). The papers are unified by two assumptions: first, the 
strategic behaviour of organised interests is significantly determined by the distribution 
of legislative influence, and second, the opportunity to become influential is a function 
of the EP’s decision-making rules. Each paper addresses a different aspect of this 
opportunity structure, which together provides a coherent explanation of the link 
between lobbying and the EP’s decision-making process. In so doing, insights are 
provided into the distribution of legislative influence within the EP and the legitimacy 
of the European Union’s policy process. The first paper explains how organised 
interests’ strategic behaviour is considerably altered in response to changes in the 
political opportunity structure afforded by each phase of the committee process. The 
second paper presents and tests a theory of indirect lobbying of the rapporteur. Here 
the institutional context is shown to be such that rapporteurs come to rely upon 
officials from their committee’s secretariat for relatively independent policy advice. 
But the policy expertise required by officials to carry out this role turns out to be 
endogenously derived from amongst the same lobbyists whose informational 
submissions the rapporteur seeks to verify. The final paper draws on longitudinal 
survey data to assess the impact of institutional rules and European party group 
membership, in the context of uncertainty amongst lobbyists as to whether their most 
closely aligned large party group will form part of a given legislative majority. This 
uncertainty provides an incentive for organised interests to lobby MEPs from opposing 
party groups in addition to more natural allies. But crucially, in performing this action 
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lobbyists defer to their hard-wired principle and lobby the most closely aligned 
members from the otherwise unfriendly party. 
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1  Introduction 
The incorporation of societal interests into the democratic political processes is vital 
for the legitimation of public policy. Organised interests1 play a central role in 
facilitating this activity through the articulation and very often aggregation of segments 
of these wider interests. Their objective, which is common to all organised interests 
active in the political process, is to influence policy-making. Political parties and in 
particular their more influential members are important targets for this attention when 
they are at the centre of decision-making. Yet invariably parties are also willing 
recipients of organised interests’ policy information, given that their political success 
is highly dependent upon demonstrating credible linkages between their policy 
platform and multiple sections of societal interests. But in addition to the potential for 
mutual benefit, the same opportunity structure that defines important aspects of the 
party system also explains much of the strategic behaviour and composition of the 
population of organised interests. Such demand-side incentives include the distribution 
of competences and agenda-setting power within and between institutions as well as 
the asymmetric growth in institutional and regulatory authority. Taken as whole, this 
picture makes clear that organised interests are integral to the functioning of an 
effective political system. Therefore, it is essential that political science explain the 
                                            
1
 Organised interests are taken to be organised societal interests that seek to influence aspects of public 
policy, but without ambition to hold public office. In contrast to the term interest group, the category 
organised interest captures single membership organisations and individual firms that become drawn 
into a given policy domain.     
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causal mechanism underlying organised interests’ interactions with the policy-making 
process.  
 The political system of the European Union (EU) is the most important agent 
for policy change within Europe. Decision-making in the EU directly affects the 
regulatory framework that applies throughout the single market and beyond, whilst its 
scope permeates the individual policy actions of member states. Partly reflecting this 
extensive policy reach, the lobbying traffic that passes through the EU’s principal 
institutions has long been greater than that found within any of its member states 
(Judge and Earnshaw, 2002). Indeed, lobbying in Brussels is more commonly likened 
to the densely populated and relatively plural landscape of Washington, DC (Streeck 
and Schmitter, 1991; Coen, 1997; Mahoney, 2008). This outcome is perhaps surprising 
given that the development of a genuine European civil society, which may be thought 
of as an essential precondition for the large scale representation of societal interests, 
remains a remote prospect. In this context the lobbying population’s early domination 
by transnational business interests and then business more generally is a logical 
corollary, particularly given the then limited policy focus. But, over time a broad range 
of civil society interests has found its voice (Coen, 2007), albeit through a further 
step(s) in the organised aggregation of policy preferences, i.e. national and European 
organisations.  
In many instances the Commission has been the catalyst for this change in 
behaviour by privileging both the role and access of civil society interests to policy-
making. This has gone some way to creating what might be thought of as a quasi-
pluralist form of policy formulation. The underlying issue that these measures have 
attempted to address are charges of opaque policy-making and clientelism. These 
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issues are fundamental to the legitimation of the political system and by implication to 
the EU itself given its particular dependence upon policy information provided by 
organised interests. The Commission’s on-going response has been to increase the 
transparency of its interactions with outside interests. This was reflected in the 
European Transparency Initiative (launched in 2005). Here the presumption was that 
transparency was a necessary prerequisite for democratic legitimacy, which in this case 
would be achieved by allowing the public scrutiny of its interactions with organised 
interests, or at least to a greater extent than had been the case (Greenwood, 2011).   
Legitimacy and transparency concerns are not confined to lobbying activity 
within the Commission. This is because the EU’s institutional structure and mode of 
operation provide organised interests with multiple opportunities to access its 
legislative process. In particular, organised interests’ policy demands have found a 
responsive audience from an ever more assertive European Parliament (EP). Organised 
interests have willingly met this demand, as ultimately it has corresponded with 
successive advances in the EP’s legislative power, both in absolute terms and relative 
to the Commission and Council. So much so, that today the EP is generally regarded as 
an equal co-legislator alongside the Council across a considerable range of policy areas 
(Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Crombez, 2001). Indeed, the latest in a series of surveys 
indicates that firms would allocate 19% of a hypothetical addition to their lobbying 
resources to the EP or members thereof, which is comparable to the now falling 
allocation that they would award to the Commission (21%) (Coen, 2010). There is also 
reason to believe that the EP may be an even more inviting venue for civil society 
interests, given that its directly elected members have a strong incentive to take 
account of publicly salient issues (Hausemer, 2006).   
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It is therefore tempting to suggest that, in contrast to the Commission, the EP as 
the EU’s sole directly elected institution derives its legitimacy from a liberal concept 
of representative democracy. However, although this concept of EP legitimacy 
continues to find favour, it is subject to challenge as part of the on-going debate over 
the EU’s alleged democratic deficit. The fundamental claim in respect to the EP is that 
there is a lack of connectivity between citizens and MEPs in comparison to that found 
in domestic political systems. European elections, whilst nominally fulfilling this 
function, are in fact a misnomer as they are fought out on the basis of domestic mid-
term policy concerns rather than upon European issues (Weiler et al., 1995; Føllesdal 
and Hix, 2006). As a consequence of these ‘second order elections’ (Reif and Schmitt, 
1980), the EP is deprived of a genuine democratic contest. This, coupled with falling 
public support for the EU even among the more ideologically committed founding six, 
creates a sense of uncertainty as to the source of the EP’s democratic legitimacy i.e. 
whether the EPs legitimacy is derived from a representative ideal of democracy, as is 
the case within national parliaments; or a participatory conception, as may be thought 
to be the case for the European Commission. This anxiety was evident in the rhetoric 
surrounding Alexander Stubb’s report, the Green Paper for a Transparency Initiative 
(2008), and also accompanied the launch of the EP and Commission’s joint ‘European 
Transparency Register’ (2011) of lobbyists. On both occasions the explicit link 
between transparency and legitimacy was highlighted.  
The quickening pace of the debate over the nature of the EP’s legitimacy and 
the growing importance of the EP as a venue for the direct representation of organised 
societal interests make the case for developing a full understanding of the nature of 
lobbying behaviour within the parliament. That organised interests are increasingly 
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drawn to the EP in response to the shifting inter-institutional balance of power 
provides a useful point of departure. This action makes it explicit that lobbyists’ 
strategic behaviour is at least partially conditioned by the prevailing location of 
political power, as it is this that provides the opportunity to become influential.  
The three papers in this thesis adopt this motivation, with organised interests’ 
strategic behaviour explained in relation to the formal and informal institutional 
context. In doing so, full account is taken of the decision-making structure that is 
prevalent within the EP, including the role of its bureaucracy and of its system of 
European party groups. This approach is in contrast to the more fully addressed non-
governmental supply-side determinants of organised interests’ behaviour. These are 
the factors that cause interest groups to mobilize and account for disparities in their 
pattern of engagement, with a particular focus placed upon organisational attributes, 
including resources, aims and goals (Bowen, 2002; Eising, 2004). These factors 
undoubtedly contribute to our knowledge of interest representation, as although 
interest groups become active in response to political authority, this is contingent upon 
their capacity to negotiate and organise (Eising 2004). But, without a nuanced 
understanding of the political opportunity structure, the picture that we have remains 
incomplete.2 Indeed, McAdam et al. (2001) highlight the dynamic relationship between 
an institution’s decision-making rules and practices on the one hand and groups’ 
ability to influence decision-making on the other. Moreover, if we fail to take account 
                                            
2
 Princen and Kerremans (2008) highlight a series of approaches that they broadly categorise as adopting 
a ‘political opportunity structure’. 
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of the political opportunity structure and instead focus solely on issues of internal 
organisation, the danger exists that the study of interest representation could become 
ever more detached from the core of political science. 
The three papers each deal with distinct and substantive aspects of the political 
opportunity structure, and in so doing address a number of specific literatures. 
However, the papers are also unified by the incorporation of approaches informed by 
literatures developed in the Congressional context and later applied to the EU, 
including signalling (Berry, 1989; Parker, 2004; Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005), 
informational exchange (Potters and Van Winden, 1992; Austen-Smith, 1993), and 
informational approaches to legislative organisation (Cooper, 1970; Gilligan and 
Krehbiel, 1987, 1989; Krehbiel, 1991; Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Whitaker, 2001; 
Kaeding, 2004; McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009).  
Particular attention is given to the more or less accepted wisdom that organised 
interests overwhelmingly lobby legislators that share their own policy preferences, but 
hardly ever undertake this activity with their opponents (Baungartner and Leech, 1996; 
Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998; Crombez, 2002). The theoretical 
approach adopted indicates that within the EP, at least a series of institutionally 
imposed constraints significantly limit this otherwise dominant behaviour. The first 
paper (chapter 2) demonstrates this through highlighting the differences in the 
opportunity structure between distinct phases of the committee process. Essentially, 
with first phase agenda setting power delegated to a single rapporteur, organised 
interests are prompted to make the strategic calculation to lobby irrespective of 
whether the office holder is a friend or foe. This decision is made easier with the 
knowledge that rapporteurs have an incentive to incorporate certain 
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unwelcome information into their report in order to secure a sufficient committee 
majority. The third paper (chapter 4) approaches this same issue, but through the EP 
party group literature, and in particular the uncertainty surrounding which of the 
dominant groups will form any given winning coalition. Here the essential insight is 
that because there is uncertainty as to which parties will be involved in the legislative 
decision, an incentive is provided for organised interests to lobby MEPs that are not 
natural policy allies rather than risk that their message goes unheard at the negotiating 
table. 
The second paper (chapter 3) builds on insights developed in the first, in 
particular on the first phase agenda-setting power of the rapporteur, and the selective 
incorporation of new policy information. The theoretical framework also draws on 
research into the role of expert knowledge in EU policy-making (Hass, 1992; Radaelli, 
1999; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999; Zito, 2001), and adapts these to the EP policy-
making phase. The principal finding is that in addition to the direct forms of lobbying 
that take place in the EP, i.e. those that form the cornerstone of the transparency 
debate, rapporteurs are also the subject of a hitherto unknown form of indirect 
lobbying via officials from the EP’s ‘independent’ committee secretariat. Essentially, 
because rapporteurs lack the resources commensurate with their considerable 
legislative task, a demand is created for technical expertise for the evaluation of 
lobbyists’ competing informational submissions. With few available options, 
rapporteurs come to rely on secretariat officials for the independent verification of 
lobbyists’ submissions. However, it turns out that these EP officials are considerably 
less expert and independent than the rapporteur supposes, given that their policy 
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expertise is often endogenously derived from the lobbying process that they are asked 
to provide advice upon.  
The theoretical approach and empirical analysis, although seeking to illuminate 
the interface between lobbyist and legislator, is considerably informed by the EP’s 
political opportunity structure. It is this that determines which legislators are more 
influential than others, and as a consequence the relative value of MEPs as lobbying 
targets to the population of organised interests. Therefore considerable attention has 
been given to the prevailing set of institutional rules, both formal and informal, as well 
as to the role of party groups in decision-making. Through this approach, in addition to 
explaining important aspects of organised interests’ strategic behaviour, new insights 
have been provided into the distribution of influence within the EP. To illustrate this, 
paper one establishes, first, that an influential subset of committee members play a 
disproportionate role in defining the committee’s final policy position and, second, that 
the act of becoming influential is a pre-condition for holding office. The second paper 
highlights the institutional rules and conditions that place permanent secretariat 
officials and seconded national experts in a position of influence. The final paper 
explores the effect of unstable winning coalitions on decision-making. 
The empirical investigations carried out for the first two papers benefitted 
directly from the responses to 177 structured interviews carried out with organised 
interests (94), MEPs/assistants (34), committee secretariat officials (39), party group 
policy advisors (8), and former MEPs (2). In addition, the first paper benefitted from 
information (unofficially obtained) on committee stage vote outcomes and compromise 
agreements. Similarly, in paper two interview results have been combined with the 
results of a questionnaire carried out by Alexander Stubb in his capacity as rapporteur 
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for the green paper on the European Transparency Initiative. The final paper combines 
MEP survey data, carried out by the European Parliamentary Research Group during 
the 5th, 6th and 7th directly-elected European Parliaments (Farrell et al, 2011), with data 
on the activities of the 724 MEPs who responded to the survey (Høyland et al, 2009). 
Together, the three papers make an important contribution to explaining the 
dynamic relationship between organised interests’ lobbying behaviour and the EP’s 
institutionally induced political opportunity structure. This directly relates the lobbying 
process to the decision-making in the EP and hence to the legitimacy of the European 
Union’s policy process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
2  Who to Lobby and When: Institutional Determinants of Interest 
Group Strategies in European Parliament Committees3 
 
 
2.1 Abstract   
This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s 
committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organisation 
and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the 
opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, 
lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is 
provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a 
committee’s final report. The theory also emphasises the role that message quality 
plays in the decision of who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to 
obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained 
from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data-set of committee-stage 
voting outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Committee organisation, European Parliament, Influence, Lobbying 
                                            
3
 Paper published in European Union Politics, 2010.   
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2.2 Introduction 
The European Union has become an increasing focus for interest group research. Yet, 
despite the European Parliament’s elevation to co-legislator across a range of policy 
areas (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Crombez, 2001), research has remained largely 
confined to examining lobbying within the Commission. This is in contrast to our more 
fully developed understanding of legislative behaviour within the Parliament (Kreppel 
and Tsebelis; 1999; Hix et al, 2007; König et al, 2007). For example, there is a gap in 
our knowledge of what prompts EP committee members to provide legislative 
advocacy on behalf of organised interests, and indeed whether ordinary committee 
members are equally effective in influencing legislative outcomes. In short, the way 
the research agenda has developed means that we know very little about the 
institutional interface between Members of the EP (MEPs) and the activities of 
lobbyists. 
This article explains how the EP’s formal procedures and its informal 
organisation determine the distribution of legislative influence amongst MEPs and 
hence the strategic behaviour of regularly participating organised interests. The 
institutional hub for this activity is the EP’s strong committee system. Through the 
adoption of a unitary actor model of lobbying it is shown how lobbyists compete to 
secure legislative change through the incorporation of their informational messages 
into a final report.  
By highlighting the informal organisation of EP committees, the article 
demonstrates how a subset of highly influential committee members exercises informal 
quality control over technically deficient or overtly biased information. As a 
consequence, these legislators bring to bear considerable influence over the outcome of 
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the committee process, and by implication the final legislative outcome. Throughout 
the analysis, influence is defined as the relative impact of an individual (legislator) on 
the final outcome, which necessarily assumes both winners and losers (Dahl, 1961). 
Crucially, lobbyists understand how influence is distributed, and that associated with 
greater influence is a requirement for higher-quality information. In addition lobbyists 
acquire complete information on the policy preferences of the rapporteur and other 
committee members. The formal procedures provide lobbyists with distinct 
opportunities to influence the final report, defining the set of possible legislative 
advocates. This creates the circumstances in which lobbyists readily lobby their 
legislative foes, a practice generally considered counterproductive. In addition, the 
open amendment phase, following the presentation of the draft report, is shown to be a 
highly significant venue for lobbying activity with at least as great an impact on a 
committee’s final position as the rapporteur’s draft report. 
These ideas are tested through structured interviews combined with an original 
data set comprising both official and unofficial information on the outcome of 2,155 
amendments, submitted to the draft reports of five co-decision legislative proposals 
during the 6th parliament. The expectation is that the findings will also hold for 
consultation, given the committee-stage procedural similarities. Interviews with 94 
actively participating lobbyists are reported, with a further 40 corroborative interviews 
undertaken within the parliament. The interviews encompassed the scope of three EP 
committees, with a particular focus placed on the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Initially, pertinent aspects 
of the interest group literature as well as that on committee organisation are reviewed. 
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Subsequently, an argument is developed to explain the means through which EP 
committees assess lobbyists’ informational submissions prior to the committee vote; 
the implications for lobbying behaviour; and the part that institutional rules play in the 
process. Thereafter, the methodological approach is discussed ahead of an empirical 
examination of the core implications.    
 
2.3 Existing research  
A precondition for advancing our understanding of lobbying behaviour in legislative 
committees is to achieve a synthesis between the distinctive literatures on EP 
committee organisation and EP lobbying. As such this necessarily limited review is 
directed towards establishing what remains to be done to bridge the literatures.     
The principal aim of lobbying within the EP is to influence the Parliament’s 
inter-institutional negotiating position, which is defined through the process of 
adopting a legislative report. The report is central to the Parliament’s decision making 
process (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004; Høyland, 2006), 
forming the bedrock of committee power. Tsebelis (1995) has argued that if the final 
report has a level of committee support commensurate to that required for an 
‘effective’ plenary majority, the report’s rapporteur will present it as a ‘take it or leave 
it offer’. In practice, this means that the EP generally defines its negotiating position 
during the committee stage in advance of the first reading in plenary (Mamadouh and 
Raunio, 2003).   
Moreover, the power of EP committees relative to both the Council and 
Parliament has increased owing to the growing tendency for it to conclude informal 
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agreements, ahead of the first reading.4 These trialogues are an indirect and informal 
consequence of the provision within the Treaty of Amsterdam (effective 1999) 
allowing co-decision legislation to be concluded in the first reading. The EP supports 
these agreements even though they implicitly diminish the role of the plenary and 
hence the legitimacy of parliament. The Council, as the more impatient legislature, 
compensates the EP for this loss with policy concessions that are in excess of what it 
would have secured in conciliation (Farrell and Héritier, 2003; Häge and Kaeding, 
2007). 
The centrality of the committee system to the parliamentary process is plain to 
see. But the distribution of influence within the committee is far less clearly defined. 
Considerable emphasis is placed on the power of the rapporteur (Kaeding, 2004; 
Benedetto, 2005). Yet the extent to which ordinary committee members are able to 
challenge this power, and the distribution of influence amongst these legislators, 
remains uncertain. As a consequence, our understanding of the pathways that lobbyists 
take to influencing a committees’ final position is limited.  
Research on lobbying the EP has for the most part focussed on explaining the 
attributes and differences in the composition of organised interests (Kohler-Koch, 
1998; Wessels, 1999). Bouwen (2004) linked this approach with the practice of taking 
access to decision makers as a measurement of influence (Coleman and Grant, 1988; 
Austen-Smith, 1993). His analysis showed that the informational characteristics 
associated with European associations means that they command the greatest level of 
parliamentary access and hence influence. However, Dür and De Bièvre (2007) have 
                                            
4
 So far the Parliament has not rejected a co-decision agreement made in trialogue.  
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highlighted the empirical hazards associated with taking access as a proxy for 
influence. Eising (2007) demonstrates that access to MEPs in general is not contingent 
on the provision of policy information, although such knowledge maybe a prerequisite 
for securing advantageous policy outcomes. Mahoney (2008) suggests that in practice 
the pattern of lobbying in the EP is driven by a scarcity of predetermined options. As a 
consequence lobbying is largely confined to the rapporteur and perhaps the shadow 
rapporteur and committee chair   
Where the research agenda has begun to address lobbyists’ strategic behaviour 
within the EP, it is through the adoption of the by now widespread consensus that 
organised interests overwhelmingly lobby their legislative allies, occasionally engage 
with fence-sitters, but only rarely interact with their opponents (Baumgartner and 
Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998). Crombez (2002) applied 
this underlying logic to the plenary. His model confirms that organised interests lobby 
policy makers that hold similar preferences at the proposal stage. But he suggests that 
this behaviour is later modified, with lobbyists switching their focus at the vote stage 
to pivotal legislators.  
The extent to which this switch in focus is likely to occur within EP 
committees has not been investigated. But it has been demonstrated elsewhere that 
lobbyists have a strong interest in developing a reputation for providing trustworthy 
information (Berry, 1989). This might suggests that this more opportunistic form of 
lobbying behaviour may be less effective in stable policy communities. Building on 
the signalling literature, Bernhagen and Bräuninger (2005) demonstrate that the 
reputational costs are such that, under certain conditions, business interests are 
prepared to abandon their short-term policy goals in favour of maintaining their 
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reputation. Hall and Deardorff (2006) explain the lobbying process in terms of a 
legislative subsidy. Here lobbyists provide costly information to carefully selected 
likeminded legislators, in support of shared policy objectives.  
The literature has provided certain expectations about lobbying behaviour, but 
we continue to lack a clear understanding of how these apply within EP committees. 
To overcome this, research must build on what we know about the organisational 
dynamics of legislative committees. However, because institutional rules vary between 
parliaments, it remains the case that theories of congressional committee organisation 
continue to inform our understanding of EP committees. The informational theories of 
legislative organisation suggest that committees operate as agents of the floor, 
providing expertise on policy outcomes (Cooper, 1970; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987, 
1989; Krehbiel, 1991). In contrast, distributive benefits approaches offer a more self-
serving account based on the desire of high-demanding legislators to secure re-election 
through the delivery of constituency benefits (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987; Weingast 
and Marshall, 1988). 
Consistent with the informational approach, we observe that the composition of 
EP committees is comparable to the plenary in terms of party group membership and 
nationality, as well as in its ideological congruence (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; 
McElroy, 2006). Perhaps surprisingly, certain research showing committee 
membership to be at variance with the plenary is also commensurate with the 
informational explanations. This is in terms of individuals members’ higher levels of 
germane prior policy interest (Whitaker, 2001) and relevant policy expertise (McElroy, 
2006). Indeed, MEPs make their choice of committee appointment on this basis rather 
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than on whether a particular appointment is of relevance to their constituency 
(Whitaker, 2001).  
Evidence of constituency demands is indirectly provided by the high level of 
EP committee lobbying undertaken by national interests (Wessels, 1999; Bouwen, 
2004), with constituency benefits presumably gained often enough to account for the 
continuance of such demands. There is also evidence to suggest that what we know for 
the committee as a whole may not account fully for its output, given that it has been 
shown that the policy preferences of rapporteurs are skewed from the committee mean 
(Kaeding, 2004). Interestingly, Yordanova (2009) has demonstrated that MEPs 
formally associated with a given interest are more likely to be assigned to a committee 
that reflects this involvement.  
The picture that emerges is, on the one hand, of a committee system where 
constituency and other partial demands, along with the associated claims for regulatory 
pork, are woven into the fabric of committee politics, and where the preferences of 
agenda setters systematically diverge from the median member of the floor. On the 
other hand, the extent that a committee can act on these demands and remain effective 
is highly contingent on the maintenance of its legitimacy vis-à-vis its principal, the 
plenary. This raises the questions of how committees are able to exercise control over 
their final position, in the face of their members’ wide-ranging demands for the 
incorporation of lobbyists’ informational messages into the final report, and what 
effect this has on lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. 
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2.4 A theory of interest group influence in EP committees 
The strategic behaviour of lobbyists in committee and the extent to which their 
information submissions are successful depend on a committee’s formal rules of 
operation, along with its informal principle of organisation. Together they determine 
how legislative influence is distributed amongst committee members, which 
determines the structure of lobbying activity. The formal rules provide a temporal 
punctuation to a report’s passage, dividing the legislation into three phases, with 
agenda-setting power shifting at each turn. This provides lobbyists with distinctive 
opportunities to influence a committee’s evolving legislative position. The 
committee’s informal rules cross-cut the formal procedures, skewing the distribution 
of influence in favour of policy-contingent elites. What follows is a fuller explanation 
of these institutional characteristics, in advance of defining the implications and 
expectations for lobbying behaviour. 
 
2.41 Formal operating procedure 
The committee stage of the legislative process begins when a proposal is received from 
the Commission and concludes when the committee adopts its final report. The agenda 
for the first phase is provided by the Commission’s legislative proposal. At this phase 
a rapporteur prepares a draft report on the proposal. By convention the rapporteur is 
left to write the report in isolation from her legislative peers.5 The rapporteur’s 
principal source of information is the avalanche of information submissions made by 
                                            
5
 The rapporteur generally writes the report in conjunction with her administrative assistant and a 
member(s) of the committee’s secretariat.  
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organised interests, as well as by the more active national representations and 
regulators. The draft report, together with un-amended sections of the Commission’s 
proposal, forms the agenda for the second, open amendment phase, where committee 
members (and other MEPs) are free to submit amendments. These open amendments 
expand the agenda for the third stage of the process: the compromise phase. More 
commonly referred to as the vote stage, this is the period when backroom deals are 
agreed ahead of the final vote, often reducing the latter to a formality.6 The three 
phases are summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1  Developing the Agenda 
        
2.42 Informal organisation 
In common with standard information assumptions, committees seek to minimise their 
uncertainty over the outcome of policy changes proposed in their final reports. In 
addition to undermining a committee’s ability to achieve its policy goals, a failure to 
minimise uncertainty would harm its reputation with the plenary, thereby reducing 
future policy discretion and hence power. If uncertainty is minimised, committees are 
                                            
6
 Prearranged compromise agreements occur on the most contested areas of legislation (as measured by 
the density of amendments). 
Agenda Phases Origin of the Agenda
1.Draft Report The Commission
2. Open Amendment Rapporteur (and Commission)
3. Compromise Members that submitted amendments, including the rapporteur
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free to conduct the transaction of normal left/right politics as well as a transparent 
trade in territorial demands. Uncertainty is reduced through the acquisition and 
interpretation of private policy information.   
However, the scale of the challenge faced by legislative committees is 
considerable. This is because, for reports that matter, committee members generally 
add an enormous amount of new information to an already complex legislative agenda 
in the form of amendments. Moreover, in comparison to parliamentarians back home, 
EP committee members are less well resourced yet are typically responsible for 
legislative procedures that are more technical. 
  As a consequence, relatively small clusters of legislators are able to exert 
disproportionate control over sections of a committee’s legislative output. This is 
because committees respond to the risk of unforeseen policy implications through a 
form of de facto subcommittee specialisation. This is an informal unorganised practice 
whereby influential members provide a level of scrutiny that lessens the likelihood of a 
committee adopting a technically deficient or overtly biased negotiating agenda.  
For an MEPs to reach this position of relative influence, the decision would 
first have been taken to become an active participant in a given policy arena. This 
action further improves their existing expertise, thereby advancing their command of 
the prevailing technocratic discourse. In short, MEPs become formidable advocates for 
their own policy positions and are able to mount challenges to others, including the 
rapporteurs. This behaviour is consistent with Corbett et al’s (2005) observation that 
there is a considerable difference in impact between active and inactive members. 
Wawro (2000) provides a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon in the US 
context.  
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The forums for this activity include committee meetings before and after the 
draft report phase; compromise meetings during the compromise phase; and within 
party group meetings throughout the process.7 Commensurate with these actions, 
influential members are more likely to be granted associated positions of authority. 
These include the formal party group roles of coordinator and rapporteur or shadow 
rapporteur (when they fall within their field of interest), as well as committee chair and 
vice chair, all of which provide additional opportunities to apply influence.   
In comparison, a committee member outside the influential set is less likely to 
have the capacity to undertake this form of advocacy, lacking the contextual 
knowledge and reputation to withstand the spotlight, which burns brighter for the 
outsider. Here direct participation in the process is often limited to faxing amendments 
to the Parliament’s secretariat. Even so, some success will be achieved, albeit when 
opposition from the more influential members is weakest, with party coordinators and 
rapporteurs anxious to maintain cohesion and dispel accusations of cartel behaviour. 
 
2.43 The implications for lobbying behaviour  
Organised interests lobby committees when there is uncertainty over salient aspects of 
a report’s outcome. This activity takes place irrespective of whether an organised 
interest was a winner or loser at the Commission stage. If they were successful at the 
Commission stage, they will lobby the relevant EP committee in order to defend the 
                                            
7
 Opposing amendments are frequently fielded by members of the same group, with party positions 
fixed after these encounters. 
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agenda (Commission proposal) from opposing lobbyists. Similarly, organised interests 
that were either unsuccessful at the commission stage or only became active following 
unforeseen changes to the agenda will lobby the committee in an attempt to secure a 
more advantageous outcome. This sense of an unrelenting campaign was expressed by 
a lobbyist from the German chemical industry who stated that, ‘it is of course better if 
they [the Commission] take up our position. But in the parliament you always begin 
again, we don’t know what happens. First we convince the rapporteur’ (Interview, 25 
February 2009). This is not to say that lobbyists’ argumentation or framing of an issue 
is unaffected by the outcome of an earlier round. Indeed, it seems probable that 
lobbyists will alter their strategy accordingly. 
Essential to this process is the decision over which legislator(s) to lobby, and at 
what point in the committee process this should occur. Lobbyists are assisted in this 
task by the hard-wired operating mantra that is common across all lobbying 
communities: 
• lobby at the earliest available point in the legislative process      (framing 
the debate); 
• lobby those with the most influence over the policy outcome; and 
• lobby legislators that are likely to be sympathetic to your position 
(friends/allies), as opposed to the possibly counterproductive action of 
lobbying legislative foes.  
However, when lobbyists seek to challenge or support the agenda set by the 
Commission, the formal procedures are such that lobbyists’ operating logic is 
frequently challenged. This is because the earliest practical point at which lobbying 
can begin is at the draft report phase but, with agenda setting power concentrated in the 
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hands of a single individual, it is far from certain that the rapporteur will be a 
legislative friend. Therefore, if organised interests are faced with an unfriendly 
rapporteur, they will be forced to choose between the otherwise compatible logics of 
lobbying only their legislative allies or to lobby at the earliest available point. 
For lobbyists, the cost of foregoing early participation is higher than the cost 
associated with lobbying a legislative foe. This is because unfriendly lobbyists realise 
that a rapporteur has a strategic incentive to incorporate certain otherwise disagreeable 
information into the draft report, and consequently compete for this concession. 
Rapporteurs are normally prepared to compromise their policy position up to the point 
at which they have secured a sufficient committee majority to ensure their report’s 
passage.8 As such, we should observe that:    
       H1. Organised interests lobby rapporteurs that they know  
              to be against their policy position. 
The second, open amendment, phase provides organised interests with 
considerably more scope to influence a committee’s agenda. This is because, with the 
procedural bottleneck removed, i.e. with the rapporteur as sole gatekeeper, lobbyists 
are free to seek advocacy from all committee members. So, for the most part, lobbyists 
will be able to find legislative friends that are willing to act as advocates.    
H2. During the open amendment phase, lobbyists do not ask                                
unfriendly legislators to advance their policy position. 
                                            
8
 Failure to build sufficient committee support can result in the rapporteur losing agenda-setting power, 
hence on occasion rapporteurs vote against their own report. 
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At this phase in the process, lobbyists continue to pursue their first phase goals, 
which may be unchanged from those conveyed to the Commission. But, in addition, 
they act in response to the newly revised agenda. This leads to an increase in the level 
of lobbying activity compared to that which would have taken place at the draft report 
phase. The allocation of such extensive resources is made with the rational expectation 
that, as a pathway to influence, the open amendment phase is as important as the draft 
report phase.                                                                        
H3. More lobbying takes place at the open amendment phase than occurs at the 
draft report phase, and,   
H4. Open amendments play a significant part in determining the outcome of a 
committee’s final report.   
Throughout both the open amendment and compromise phases, the informal 
system of subcommittee scrutiny comes to the fore. The direct effect of this 
phenomenon is to mitigate the threat of unforeseen policy consequences. The indirect 
effect is to shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. This is because actively participating 
lobbyists act in response to their comprehensive understanding of the asymmetric 
distribution of committee influence. Their shared knowledge is gained first hand, 
primarily in the course of their attendance at committee meetings. Through their 
presence, which invariably outnumbers attending members, they directly observe the 
hierarchy of influence in what is the EP’s most adversarial formal setting. In addition, 
information becomes shared through the steady flow of staff between competing 
organisations, as well as from the offices of influential committee members. As a 
result, the following hypotheses should hold:  
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H5. Within the committee, the distribution of influence is skewed in favour of an 
influential elite, and crucially; 
H6. Lobbyists understand the distribution of influence that exists between 
committee members.                                                                                                                      
But, for lobbyists, it is not simply a question of picking out an influential and 
friendly legislator to act on their behalf. This is because committee members that are 
influential and hence relatively well informed demand higher quality information than 
their less influential colleagues. This can be thought of as being analogous to a 
legislative subsidy. The consequence of this additional informal constraint is that 
lobbyists with poor-quality information seek to avoid the risk to their reputation 
associated with approaching an influential ally, an action commensurate to that 
outlined in the signalling literature. As a result, they diminish their pool of potential 
legislative advocates. This constraint was expressed succinctly by a lobbyist from the 
insurance industry who stated that: ‘it is never a problem to find a legislator to put 
forward your amendment, but it is a different matter when it comes to finding one that 
is capable of convincing others to vote for it’ (Interview, 23 October 2008).  
Lobbyists with poor-quality information nevertheless continue to seek 
advocacy, but from a non-influential friend, i.e. someone that is likely to be broadly 
sympathetic yet relatively unconcerned about their reputation on such issues. The 
explanation for why lobbyists approach legislators with seemingly little chance of 
affecting the committee position is because lobbyists are simply the outward 
representative of their organisations, and as such have no choice over whether to put 
information forward. But, through their knowledge of the legislative hierarchy, which 
is unlikely to be widely known within their organisation, they are able to exercise a 
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form of quality control over which amendments they put forward to which legislator, 
thereby allowing them to maintain their personal reputation.  
H7. Lobbyists refrain from submitting poor quality messages to their influential 
friends, in favour of their less influential allies. 
During the final compromise phase the role of new information is to provide 
the arguments that enable friendly legislators to win the debate. This is either through 
buttressing existing information submissions or by counteracting unwelcome changes 
to the agenda made during the previous phase. In either scenario, it remains 
advantageous to secure the support or neutrality of the rapporteur, who remains 
influential at the final vote and beyond. But in contrast to the previous phase, all 
lobbyists are faced with a diminished pool of potential legislative allies. In this case, 
the less influential members will have faded from view, leaving negotiations to those 
better equipped. Therefore, both courses of action are largely confined to lobbying an 
influential friend, which necessarily requires the provision of relatively high quality 
information. In the case of counteracting newly revealed opposing positions, this 
activity is contingent on a lobbyist locating a likeminded influential legislator. The 
foregoing explanation is summarised in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1  Who to lobby at each committee phase 
 
 
2.5 Research design 
To overcome the limitations associated with explaining informal behaviour, a mixed 
research strategy was adopted. This combined a programme of face-to-face surveying 
with data collected for five co-decision reports.9 In all, 134 interviews (plus a pilot) 
were conducted, of which the 94 that were undertaken with lobbyists are reported, with 
the remainder indirectly facilitating the research. The data analysis combines 
information on committee-stage vote outcomes and compromise agreements, with 
survey data and information on the submissions of committee-stage open amendments. 
The final voting lists and compromise agreements were informally obtained from 
officials closely involved with the procedures, because the EP does not retain this 
documentation. 
                                            
9
 The interviews were conducted between 2007 and 2009.  
Committee Phases Who to Lobby
Draft Report Rapporteur
friend                     foe
lobby                        lobby
Open Amendment
friend                                    foe
influential     non-influential            don’t lobby
lobby                lobby*                                              
Committee member
Compromise  Committee member
influential     non-influential             don’t lobby
friend                                     foe       
lobby           don’t lobby     
*if the quality of the information is poor.
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The 94 survey interviews were conducted with lobbying practitioners defined 
as regular and prominent participants. The initial objective was to capture a population 
of lobbyists active in a substantive policy sector. To this effect, of the 65 organised 
interests defined as highly active in the area of financial services (Econ Committee), 
63 agreed to be interviewed. The study was then broadened to include 18 lobbyists 
from the environment and chemicals sectors of the Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety Committee, and a further 13 practitioners from the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection Committee. Together, these three committees are representative 
of the EP’s legislative output, accounting for a third of all co-decision reports.  
 The selection of lobbyists was conditional on the verification of their status by 
at least two individuals from differing sectors of the policy community (average 3.01), 
i.e. two from the following three: MEP/MEP’s assistant; member of the EP secretariat; 
or a previously verified organised interest. In total, 40 corroborative interviews were 
conducted across the three committees. These institutional interviews included thirteen 
MEPs, representing six member states and four party groups; two former MEPs; six 
assistants to MEPs; seven party group advisors, from the three principal party groups; 
and twelve mid-ranking officials from the EP’s secretariat who were directly involved 
with the preparation and passage of committee-stage legislative reports. In addition to 
providing direct insights, these interviews were conducted in order to corroborate or 
expose disjuncture in lobbyists’ responses. It was found at the pilot stage that lobbyists 
tended to be reticent about disclosing information that implied that they made rational 
calculations about the relative influence of MEPs. As a result, several of the questions 
were rephrased.  
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A possible implication of excluding the more episodic lobbying participants 
from the theory and hence the empirical analysis is that differing strategic behaviours 
may have been overlooked. This is because these more transient participants are less 
likely to have acquired the otherwise shared strategic knowledge, particularly with 
regard to a committee’s informal organisation.  
 
 2.6 Findings 
The theory makes plain that both the formal procedures and informal organisation of 
EP committees, play a vital role in determining which legislators are lobbied by 
organised interests and when. The empirical analysis follows the procedural timeline, 
initially testing the procedural implications for lobbying behaviour, ahead of an 
assessment of the hypotheses in support of the informal aspect of the theory.  
2.61 The draft report phase  
The initial step was to establish whether the draft report phase can be taken as the 
starting point for committee-stage lobbying. To assess this, interviewees were simply 
asked:  
‘In an ideal world at which point in the committee process would you begin 
concerted attempts to influence the legislative outcome?’ 
Through the use of the phrase ‘in an ideal world’, the question solicited 
responses that controlled for factors that might prevent such early interventions. The 
result was clear. All of the lobbyists that responded (81/94) stated that they would 
want to lobby at the draft report phase, i.e. the rapporteur. This result gives relevance 
to the more interesting premise that organised interests lobby rapporteurs that they 
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know to be against their policy position (H1). To test this hypothesis, the following 
question was asked:  
‘If you know in advance that the rapporteur opposes the position of your 
organisation, to what extent if any does this fact prevent you from directly 
putting forward your policy position?’  
The results, which are summarised in Table 2.2, confirm the expectation that 
lobbyists only occasionally defect from lobbying a rapporteur that happens to be a 
legislative foe. For more than half of all lobbyists that answered, the policy position of 
the rapporteur had no bearing on their decision to lobby, with no lobbyists claiming 
that it always structured their decision.  
 
Table 2.2  How often organised interests lobby a rapporteur that is a legislative foe? 
 
 
This situation was confirmed through interviews with MEPs and members of 
the secretariat, with several committee members expressing surprise that whilst they 
were acting as rapporteur they were frequently approached by lobbyists from sections 
of the policy spectrum that they had openly criticised in the past. One member from 
the Socialist group complained that, on occasions, ‘they threaten that if I don’t include 
Always (100%) 9 16 25 52.1%
More than 50% but less than always 4 12 16 33.3%
Less than 50% 2 5 7 14.6%
Never 0 0 0 0
Unable to assess 3 6 9 -
Total 18 39 57 100%
All 
Interests
Percentage of 
respondents 
making an 
assessment
Interests 
Non 
Financial
Interests 
Financial
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their position, the report will be picked apart during committee’ (Interview, 21 March 
2007). The implication from this threat is that not only is the lobbyist confident of 
gaining influential support from elsewhere in the committee, but if the rapporteur fails 
to incorporate the lobbyist’s demands, the integrity of the entire report could be 
compromised. This mode of behaviour is conditional on a lobbyist not having a 
friendly relationship to maintain, i.e. has nothing to lose, and the likelihood that a 
rapporteur will be alert to the need to make strategic compromises. 
 
2.62 The open amendment phase as a pathway to influence   
The theory places considerable emphasis on the open amendment phase, and in 
particular the role of the committee floor. In so doing, as a pathway of influence this 
second phase is elevated to a level of significance comparable to that of the draft report. 
Therefore, the first condition we should observe is that more lobbying takes place at 
the open amendment phase than occurs at the draft report phase (H3). 
To assess this hypothesis, lobbyists were asked to define the proportion of 
informational messages that they ultimately conveyed to the committee that were first 
communicated to the rapporteur at the drafting phase. The question explicitly takes 
account of the dynamic nature of the process, inviting lobbyists to consider their 
responses to the evolving agenda: 
‘With regard to the co-decision legislation that your organisation has 
been actively involved with, what percentage of your legislative concerns, 
that you were ultimately able to raise in committee, were you able to 
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directly convey to the rapporteur prior to the completion of the draft 
report?’ 
The results are summarised in Table 2.3. They show that, when lobbyists were 
asked to consider the full range of their legislative concerns raised in the course of the 
committee process, the majority of respondents (58.2%) stated that less than half of 
these issues were conveyed to the rapporteur prior to the completion of the draft report, 
and no lobbyist claimed 100% success. What is more, this result is likely to understate 
the level of second phase lobbying activity, given that the structure of the question was 
such that interviewees were not invited to include the occasions when they resubmitted 
information that they had previously presented to the rapporteur. 
 
Table 2.3  Percentage of informational messages that were conveyed by lobbyists 
during the committee stage, that were first conveyed during the preparation of the draft 
report  
 
 
Nevertheless, it remains possible that this result simply measures the overall 
volume of traffic, rather than the substantive effect of lobbying. Therefore, the second 
condition that should hold is that open amendments play a significant part in 
determining the outcome of a committee’s final report (H4).   
Above 75% 3 10 13 19.4%
More than 50%, but less than 75% 3 12 15 22.4%
Less than 50%, but more than 25% 7 13 20 29.8%
25% or less 6 13 19 28.4%
Unable to assess 12 15 27 -
Total 31 63 94 100%
Interests 
Non 
Financial
Interests 
Financial
All 
Interests
Percentage of 
respondents 
making an 
assessment
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Through analysing committee-stage voting data on all amendments that were 
made to the five legislative procedures, i.e. those made by the rapporteur in the draft 
reports as well as the subsequent open amendment phase, the relative importance of 
the two phases can be more clearly assessed.      
In total, 2,854 amendments were submitted to the five legislative procedures 
under analysis. Of these, just 699 were contained within the rapporteurs' draft reports, 
and many of these were of a purely administrative nature. However, it remains possible 
that even this higher level of second-phase activity is simply background noise. But 
when the number of ultimately successful open amendments (1,330) is compared with 
the raw total submitted at the draft report stage, successful open amendments exceed 
those put forward in the draft report by a ratio approaching 2:1. This suggests that, at 
the very least, the lobbying activity that takes place during the open amendment stage 
is comparable in its effect on a committee’s final position to that which takes place 
during the draft report phase. 
Furthermore, these results are likely to understate the importance of the 
committee floor, and by extension the role of more influential legislators. This is 
because the rapporteur’s revised agenda (draft report) would have already taken 
account of certain opposing positions. 
 
2.63 Informal organisation   
Through establishing how a committee’s formal procedures determine important 
aspects of lobbying behaviour, the foundation is laid to analyse the existence and 
impact of informal behaviour on committee organisation. The open amendment phase 
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and the results thereof represent the only opportunity to directly observe the relative 
impact of ordinary MEPs on a committee’s final report, albeit with the benefit of 
hitherto unavailable voting data. Two hypotheses are tested to establish whether, 
within the committee, the distribution of influence is skewed in favour of an influential 
elite (H5); and crucially, that lobbyists understand the distribution of influence between 
committee members (H6). 
To assess these conditions, a model is presented that measure the extent to 
which lobbyists’ assessment of influential committee members correlates with MEPs’ 
actual levels of influence. The dependent variable interest group rank captures who 
lobbyists believe to be the most influential legislators in the policy field. It was derived 
from the responses of lobbyists to the question: 
‘Which MEPs would you say have the most influence over the content of  the 
Econ committee’s final report, in the area of financial services regulation?’ 
 In all, 52 organised interests provided results. The scores for each MEP are 
detailed in Table A of Appendix I. The variable is made up of 57 observations, of 
which 33 have positive values, and 24 take the value 0 (mean = 4.58). With these 
characteristics, the dependent variable is most accurately described as a count 
outcome, as such the Poisson distribution is most appropriate for data analysis. The 
Negative Binominal variant of the Poisson model was not used following a test for 
over dispersion, which failed to reject the null hypothesis that conditional variance 
equals the conditional mean (Long, 1997). A comparison between predicted and 
observed probabilities further implies that the model selection is appropriate (see 
Figure A, Appendix I).  
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The independent variable of particular interest to the theory is successful 
amendments. It was constructed to provide a measure of actual MEP success and hence 
legislative influence. The variable measures an MEP’s total number of successful 
amendments. A possible drawback of this approach is that an MEP’s level of failure is 
not taken into account; the emphasis is placed firmly on an MEP’s relative impact on 
the final report. The variable is logged because its relationship with the dependent 
variable interest group rank was found to be approximately linear (see Figure B, 
Appendix I).  
In the absence of roll-call data, information on vote outcome was compiled 
through unofficial access to committee compromise agreements and final notated 
voting lists. This is the first time that such documents have been analysed. In total 
2,155 open amendments were submitted to five co-decision reports: The Capital 
Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions - Basel II; Payment Services in 
the Internal Market; Solvency II; Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS); and Capital Requirements. The procedures were all 
completed in their first reading, which is increasingly the norm; in four separate years; 
by different rapporteurs from the EP’s three principal party groups. 
The range of individual submissions was between 1 and 178. If an amendment 
was adopted at the vote stage it is coded as 1, and if it failed it is coded as 0. Joint 
submissions are attributed in proportion. For the significant number of amendments 
later incorporated in compromise agreements, the outcome was not always discernable. 
To overcome this problem, these amendments were individually assessed in 
conjunction with individuals closely involved in the procedure. If an amendment was 
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only partially included in the compromise, a coding value of 0.5 is awarded. The total 
of successful amendments was 1,330, with a range between 1 and 146 for each MEP.  
A series of dummy control variables is added to the model. The first two relate 
to positions of authority within the committee and take the value of 1 if an MEP is an 
office holder. Here the position of party co-ordinator is included because this role 
specifically involves brokering legislative agreements within the respective European 
party groups. The variable committee chair/vice chair is included in order to capture 
the effect of seniority within the formal committee structure. The remaining dummy 
variables are confined to party membership. Here the two principal transnational party 
groups are reported: EPP (European Peoples Party) and PES (Party of European 
Socialists). The party reference category is made up of all other European party 
groups, including the ELDR (Liberals). 
Table 2.4 presents the results. They show that of the five explanatory variables, 
two have significant explanatory power in explaining the variance in the perceived 
level of MEP influence. The independent variable that is of particular interest to the 
theory, successful amendments, is both highly significant and in the right direction. 
The results indicate that for a one percentage point increase in the number of 
successful amendments that, an MEP achieves, her expected mean interest group rank 
increases by a factor of 1.01 (one percentage point), holding all other variables 
constant.10  
 
 
                                            
10
 βexp(= successful amendment)log (1.01)  = 3.087 log (1.01) = 1.01  
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Table 2.4  Poisson model: organised interests’ assessment of the most influential 
MEPs in the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee 
 
 
To put this in context, if the number of successful amendments that an MEP 
achieves is at the level of the mean for those submitting amendments (23.3), a 
hypothetical doubling of the number of successful amendments to 46.6 would result in 
the predicted number of lobbyists that cited the MEP increase by a factor of 2.18, from 
4.58 to 10.0. This would cause the MEP to move from a position of the nineteenth 
most cited individual to a position of the ninth.        
 This result supports the assertion that the assessment made by organised 
interests when considering the legislative influence of MEPs is commensurate with the 
observable actions of legislators. Organised interests understand which legislators have 
the most influence over a committee’s negotiating agenda, and it follows that there 
Incident rate ratio Z-Score
(exponential β)
 Successful Amendments (log)      3.087*** 13.82
(0.252)
 Party Co-ordinator   1.326* 1.69
(0.221)
 Committee Chair/Vice Chair 1.132 0.68
(0.208)
 EPP 0.965 -0.21
(0.161)
 PES 0.893 -0.58
(1.098)
Constant       0.115***
(0.042)
 Number of Observations 57
 Log-likelihood -81.11
 LRχ2(6)     470.14***
 Pseudo R2 0.74
 Notes: ***significant  at 0.01 level, **significant  at  0.05 level, *significant at 0.1 level.
 Standard errors in parenthesis
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exists a subset of influential committee members. This relationship is further illustrated 
in Figure 2.2, which shows the predicted count as a function of the number of 
successful amendments, with all other values held at their means. 
 
Figure 2.2  Predicted counts: interest group rank and number of successful 
amendments
 
The control variable party coordinator is significant at the .1 level. This indicates that 
the effect of holding office for one of the three major party groups increases the 
expected interest group rank by a factor of 1.33 (33%), holding all other variables 
constant. The result for committee chair/vice chair, although not significant, is in the 
same direction. Taken at face value these results appear to indicate that lobbyists 
overestimate the influence that party co-ordinators have over the committee process. 
But the more likely reading, which is consistent with the theoretical explanation, is that 
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lobbyists take account of the often decisive yet unobservable role that party 
coordinators play in defining their party’s position over which amendment to support.    
One concern with this conclusion might be that the influential set is simply 
comprised of officeholders (party coordinators and committee chair/vice chair). A 
final probe into the data sheds some light on the profile of influential committee 
members. Consistent with the theory, it comes as no surprise that just 10 MEPs 
account for 56% (752) of all successful amendments. More interestingly, the majority 
of these amendments (52%) come from members that are not officeholders, showing 
that influence is not simply a product of office.  
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that, although a committee 
member’s influence may increase with office, a precondition to obtaining office is to 
be a member of the influential set. This can be illustrated with regard to the three most 
influential committee members, who together account for 28% of all successful 
amendments. Of the three, only Wolf Klinz was an office holder when the reports were 
written (party coordinator for ELDR). However, the remaining two influential 
members, who were not office holders at the time, subsequently became so.11  
2.64 Who not to lobby 
What remains to be examined is how lobbyists navigate their way through the informal 
landscape. The initial expectation is that, once the draft report has been completed, the 
                                            
11
 Jean-Paul Gauzès, who submitted the highest number of successful amendments, took over as party 
coordinator for the EPP. Sharon Bowls was appointed as committee chair at the start of the 7th 
parliament. The expectation is that their respective interest group rank relative to their observable 
performance will increase, as we observed for Wolf Klinz. 
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pool of legislators is sufficiently wide that, during the open amendment phase, 
lobbyists do not ask unfriendly legislators to advance their policy position (H2). This 
impression was frequently communicated; for example, a lobbyist from a regional 
banking association stated of one influential MEP that she ‘would always take the line 
of the international banks’ and was therefore off limits, whereas for another it was 
claimed that he would ‘first seek the opinion of the city of London institutions before 
agreeing to act’. To systemise these responses the following direct question was asked:  
‘When seeking to change an aspect of a draft report once it has been 
presented, do you find yourself seeking assistance from legislators that 
are likely to be sympathetic to your position or are you typically seeking 
assistance from MEPs that you know in advance to be unsympathetic?’ 
The results, presented in Table 2.5, support the hypothesis. The majority of 
lobbyists (61%) that responded never ask legislative foes to submit amendments on 
their behalf. Further investigation suggested that, when lobbyists deviate from this 
position, it is often because they find themselves politically isolated and therefore 
without legislative allies to approach. 
 
Table 2.5  How often lobbyists ask a legislative foe to submit an amendment,  
following the submission of the draft report?  
 
 
Always (100%) 0 0 0 0
More than 50% but less than always 4 5 9 11.7%
Less than 50% 5 16 21 27.3%
Never 15 32 47 61.0%
Unable to assess 7 10 17 -
Total 31 63 94 100%
Percentage of 
respondents 
making an 
assessment
Interests 
Non 
Financial
Interests 
Financial
All 
Interests
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What remains to be ascertained is whether lobbyists refrain from submitting 
poor-quality messages to their influential friends, in favour of their less influential 
allies (H7). To establish this, a final direct question was asked: 
‘Was the content of your requests for legislative action ever such that it 
was more appropriate to seek action from legislators outside the group of 
committee members that you defined as influential?’  
The response rate was comparatively low, with several lobbyists expressing 
annoyance at the suggestion that they made such cynical calculations. Nevertheless, 
further investigations did not reveal any response bias. Of the 88 lobbyists questioned, 
44 answered. Of these respondents, 38 (86.4%) revealed that there were occasions 
when they preferred to deliver their informational message to MEPs outside the set of 
most influential legislators. This suggests that when lobbyists are in possession of 
poor-quality information they are likely to defect from the otherwise optimal strategy 
of obtaining advocacy from their most influential legislative allies. Furthermore, given 
that we know that once the draft report phase has passed only friendly legislators are 
lobbied, we can infer that it is less influential friends that receive these relatively poor-
quality submissions.   
 
2.7  Conclusion 
This article contributes to our understanding of the institutional interface between 
MEPs and the activities of organised interests. In so doing, a response is provided to 
the call for the literature to explain more fully how lobbying behaviour is shaped by 
specific institutional rules and practices (Coen, 2007). Through directly linking 
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lobbyists’ strategic behaviour to the institutional setting, a decisive break is made with 
the analysis of interests based on a narrow categorisation of their organisational form. 
This has made it possible to provide fresh insights into the question of which interests 
actually lobby and when; an issue that has vexed political science for a period 
approaching half a century. 
The study advances our understanding of the organisation of EP committees by 
explaining the hitherto unknown role that an influential subset of committee members 
plays in defining a committee’s final position. The collective actions of an informal 
and influential elite minimise the risk of a committee adopting technically deficient or 
explicitly biased information. It is further shown that committee influence is not 
simply a factor of holding office, and that becoming influential is likely to be a 
prerequisite to obtaining office. Through this approach it has also been established that 
the open amendment phase has at least as much impact on a committee’s final outcome 
as the rapporteur’s report. This demonstrates that influential committee members pose 
a credible counter weight to the acknowledged power of the rapporteur. 
Furthermore, this analysis is consistent with informational theories of 
legislative organisation (Cooper, 1970; Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987, 1989; Krehbiel, 
1991). The study sets out the mechanism which prevents committees from adopting 
policy positions that threaten their legitimacy vis-à-vis the plenary. This is particularly 
relevant given that the policy position of rapporteurs is generally unrepresentative of 
the committee mean (Kaeding, 2004). This contributes to the explanation of why 
parliament is increasingly willing to allow its committees to conclude seemingly 
binding legislative agreements (trialogue) on its behalf.   
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I have also demonstrated that, although lobbyists have a strong preference to 
lobby their allies, within EP committees the formal constraints are such that organised 
interests routinely lobby their opponents. This finding is in contrast to both Crombez’s 
(2002) model for the plenary and the consensus found in the US literature. However, 
by highlighting the open amendment phase it has also been shown that lobbyists do not 
remain limited in their choice of viable lobbying targets, as Mahoney (2008) suggests. 
Here lobbyists are free to revert to their default position of lobbying their friends. 
Nevertheless, constraints persist but this time they are self-imposed, based upon the 
quality of their information. Through demonstrating that, in order to maintain their 
reputation, lobbyists refrain from submitting poor quality information to high 
demanding influential friends, some findings from previous research are further 
consolidated (Berry, 1989; Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005; Hall and Deardorff, 
2006).  
The paper also provides several implications for future research on lobbying 
and legislative politics. For a long time EP legislative scholars have benefitted from a 
stream of insights empirically tested with the aid of roll-call data. However, with the 
majority of co-decision legislation now agreed ahead of the first reading, it seems that 
this approach is losing some of its former resonance. To maintain the momentum, we 
need to build on this paper’s comparatively modest data-collection effort and pay more 
attention to the outcomes of committee-stage votes. In addition, there is scope to 
extend the model to address the extent to which lobbyists’ argumentation or framing of 
an issue is contingent on their previous success or failure at the Commission stage. 
Finally, it seems likely that this paper’s principal theoretical insights will have 
meaning outside the context of the EP. This is because at the core of this paper is the 
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impact of institutional procedures and informal organisation on lobbying behaviour, 
and it is precisely these institutional variables that differ between legislatures. 
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3  Do Rapporteurs Receive Independent Expert Policy Advice? 
Indirect Lobbying via the European Parliament’s Committee 
Secretariat12 
   
3.1 Abstract  
 Rapporteurs rely on secretariat officials to provide policy information that is 
independent from vested interests. They require this information to be provided 
quickly, so that lobbyists’ policy claims ahead of the completion of the draft report. 
However, it turns out that officials’ accumulation of specific policy expertise is 
endogenous to the lobbying process. Secretariat officials are generalists lacking the 
detailed policy information that they are called upon to supply. Entrenched interests 
including the Commission fill the void by providing officials with policy information 
and on occasion even loan their experienced staff, thereby indirectly lobbying the 
rapporteur. This activity directly affects the content of EU legislation, as the 
information that rapporteurs receive and act upon is less independent than might have 
been expected. These ideas are analysed with the aid of responses from over 150 
structured interviews with policy actors and the results of an EP internal questionnaire. 
 
 
Keywords: committee secretariat, European Parliament, lobbying, rapporteur.  
                                            
12
 Paper published in the Journal of European Public Policy, 2012. 
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3.2 Introduction  
The structure and determining factors for lobbying Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) are now very well understood (Wessels, 1999; Crombez, 2002; 
Marshall, 2010). The epicentre for this activity is the European Parliament’s (EP) 
strong committee system and, above all its rapporteurs. This paper builds on these 
insights to explore the extent to which committee rules have unintentionally provided 
entrenched interests with an additional opportunity to influence the legislative 
outcome. Through this approach a further dimension to lobbyists’ strategic behaviour 
is revealed. This is the strategic practice of indirectly lobbying rapporteurs via their 
principal source of independent policy information: the committee secretariat. 
Consequently, policy information that rapporteurs receive from secretariat officials 
turns out to be endogenous to the lobbying process for which objective verification is 
sought. 
The role of policy information is central to this analysis. In general, legislators 
fear unintended policy outcomes, and seek policy information that diminishes this risk. 
This function is normally performed by a closed network of likeminded lobbyists 
(Baumgartner and Leech, 1996). However, this practice is insufficient for the 
rapporteur to carry out the delegated and fundamentally more complex task of agenda 
setting. In this role, rapporteurs are obliged for strategic reasons to engage with the 
entire population of actively participating lobbyists; they selectively incorporate 
information from opposing interests - at the possible exclusion of aspects of their own 
policy aspirations. This creates a demand by the rapporteur for independent policy 
expertise. 
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They seek this information with the expectation that it will increase their 
political leverage both inside their party group and in negotiations with shadow 
rapporteurs and other influential committee members. With limited own resources, 
rapporteurs invariably turn to the mid-ranking committee official(s) assigned to their 
legislative report. Rapporteurs perceive these administrators to be independent, at least 
relative to the available options, and in possession of relevant policy expertise. The 
formal rules support these assumptions. However, secretariat officials are policy 
generalists, with severely limited in-house informational resources. Therefore, in order 
for them to fulfil their role and maintain their reputation for independent expertise, 
they are themselves obliged to make demands for policy information. These demands 
are fulfilled by actively participating organised interests as well as by officials from the 
Commission. Indeed these stakeholders anticipate the demand and actively seek to 
influence the policy position of secretariat officials.  
Through this process it is shown that despite the demands of rapporteurs for 
independent expertise, the information they receive is likely to be derived from a 
subset of entrenched policy interests. As such, there is limited scope for new and 
independent information to enter the policy arena. Instead the position of entrenched 
interests is further privileged, with other perhaps equally valid interests excluded.  
This argument is tested with the aid of both structured interviews and responses 
to a written questionnaire. The interviews were conducted during the 6th and 7th 
parliaments (2007-2010) comprising 94 actively participating lobbyists, 39 mid-
ranking officials from committee secretariats, and 34 MEPs/assistants. The focus was 
on respondents’ behaviour in the context of the co-decision procedure. The 
questionnaire was carried out in 2007 by then MEP Alexander Stubb, in his capacity as 
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rapporteur for the green paper on the European Transparency Initiative. Responses are 
reported for 80 MEPs and 31 secretariat officials. 
In the following section a brief exploration of salient aspects of the literature on 
EP lobbying and decision making is carried out. This underpins the theoretical 
argument, which is fully specified in the subsequent section. Thereafter the research 
design is explained ahead of a thorough examination of four derived hypotheses. 
 
3.3 Theoretical considerations  
There is a growing understanding of the strategies that organised interests deploy to 
influence public policy in the European Union (Beyers et al, 2009; Coen and 
Richardson, 2009). Integral to this process are lobbyists’ informational advantages, 
with both Commission bureaucrats and EP legislators demanding specific expertise 
from reputable organisations (Bouwen, 2002).  
The most important mechanism for the inclusion of new information into the 
parliamentary phase of the legislative process is the formal development of the 
committees’ negotiating position: the legislative report. This legislative activity is 
central to decision-making within the EP (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Mamadouth and 
Raunio, 2003; Selck and Steunenburg, 2004; Ringe, 2010). What is more, the relative 
power of EP committees vis-à-vis the plenary continues to grow, as it becomes 
increasingly common for them to make de facto legislative agreements with the 
Council (Farrell and Héritier, 2003; Häge and Kaeding, 2007). Therefore, in a very 
direct sense, EP committees operate as agents of the floor (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 
61 
 
1987). As a consequence, the committee system is the main focus for lobbying activity 
within the EP (Wessels, 1999). 
Research indicates that relatively few committee members exert significant 
influence on the final report, with these MEPs necessarily becoming the principal 
focus for organised interests’ policy demands. Mahoney (2008) suggests that these 
viable lobbying targets are limited to the rapporteur, shadow rapporteur and committee 
chair. Marshall (2010) demonstrates that the distribution of influence, although 
skewed, extends to a wider pool of committee members from which rapporteurs are 
drawn. But for each proposal, the rapporteur remains the single most influential EP 
actor, with over a third of all amendments that later make it through committee 
originating from his or her draft reports. 
 Our understanding of how lobbyists influence legislative behaviour within the 
EP is increasingly informed through the adoption of an information approach 
(Crombez, 2002; Marshall, 2010). The essential insight is that by giving legislators 
credible yet selective information on the anticipated effects of a policy, organised 
interests can alter legislators’ preferred policy options (Potters and Van Winden, 1992; 
Austen-Smith, 1993). The underlying assumption is that information is required by 
policy-makers to evaluate a range of possible policy outcomes. But, this information is 
unevenly distributed between policy-makers and outside interests. As a result, 
legislators are often highly dependent on organised interests for policy expertise.  
The signalling literature offers an explanation for this interaction by 
demonstrating that lobbyists’ strategic use of information is subject to severe 
reputational constraints imposed by the legislator. Lobbyists seek to protect their 
reputation for providing reliable information (Berry, 1989). So much so that under 
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certain conditions private interests forego their short term policy goals in order to 
protect their reputation (Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005). It is therefore not 
surprising that policy-makers are in the main lobbied by organised interests with policy 
preferences close to their own (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996). Hall and Deardorff 
(2006) identify a variant of this behaviour as a form of legislative subsidy. Here the 
costly information that is provided to selected legislators acts as a substitute for their 
own staff, thereby directly affecting the budget line. This practice varies from the 
provision of policy expertise to the formalised secondment of staff.  
  The literature only partially explores indirect channels for lobbyists to 
influence the content of a rapporteur’s draft report. Lehmann (2009) suggests that the 
primary conduits in this process are the committee secretariat and the rapporteur’s own 
staff. There seems little doubt that rapporteurs’ office assistants play an often vital role 
in the preparation of the draft report. After all, they are generally the only own 
resource available. However, it is analytically problematic to make a distinction 
between a rapporteur and their staff, given that in contrast to secretariat officials these 
assistants are formally subordinate.   
This leaves the committee secretariat as the likely target for indirect lobbying, 
although it remains conceivable that the respective party group secretariats may also 
act as channels for this activity. However, through Neunreither’s (2006) insider 
perspective it made clear that the party group secretariats do not normally provide such 
direct assistance to rapporteurs. Their role appears to be centred on developing a 
coherent party line inside their group, and then marketing this position both within and 
to a wider audience outside of the group (Winzen, 2011). In contrast, the literature 
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makes clear that officials from committee secretariats are actively involved at the draft 
report stage (Neuhold and Radulova, 2006; Neunreither, 2006; Winzen, 2011).  
The appropriate analytical approach for understanding the committee 
secretariat’s role in the policy process is not immediately apparent. There is of course a 
substantial formal literature on the role of bureaucracy in policy formation. Yet its 
applicability to the committee secretariat appears doubtful given that, for example, 
there is no bureau to maximise (Niskanen, 1971) and hence no formal discretionary 
power granted, which in turn limits the scope for agency drift (Weingast, 1984; 
McCubbins et al, 1987). Yet information asymmetry, which is commonly seen as the 
basis for bureaucratic as well as interest group power, remains central to the analysis. 
Simply put, officials attain legitimacy by providing technocratic solutions to policy 
making (Majone, 1996; Radaelli, 1999). This necessitates an understanding of how 
expert knowledge is utilised within the EU’s policy process.  
Emphasis has been placed on the authoritative role of epistemic communities, 
comprised of professionals with a reputation for policy-relevant expert knowledge 
(Hass, 1992). However, the impact of such communities is likely to be most 
pronounced at the initial phase of EU policy making when private and public actors are 
first brought into the process (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). Indeed Zito (2001) 
suggests that to achieve substantial policy change across veto points a particularly 
robust form of entrepreneurship is required. But even at the Commission’s evaluation 
and consultation stage it remains unclear whether shared technocratic considerations of 
epistemic communities are a salient feature of policymaking.   
Boswell’s (2008) analysis suggests that there is an instrumental use of 
knowledge within the Commission: policy-makers selectively draw from a wide pool 
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of expertise in order to legitimise or validate exogenously held policy positions. 
Similarly, Erickson et al (2010) provide evidence of a politicisation of EU policy 
formulation, extending to the analysis of risk. Again expertise is explicitly called upon, 
but this time in support of competing lobbies and ideologies. The explanation 
advanced for whether policy development is dominated by a politicisation of technical 
expertise, as opposed to a policy-relevant epistemic community, lies in the 
comparative strength of active advocacy alliances coupled with the associated framing 
of the political agenda. The inference from both of these studies is that within the 
Commission, there may be limited scope for the inclusion of unbiased policy 
information. However, this analysis is absent from the literature on the EP. What we 
know is that in comparison the EP is a more explicitly political institution. This 
suggests that there may be greater opportunities for political entrepreneurship, with 
‘losers’ seeking to unpick the agenda and others seeking to preserve or extend their 
gains.  
But what role do officials from the committee secretariat play during this phase 
of the policy process? We know that secretariat officials operate at the heart of the 
legislative process. One or perhaps two mid-ranking officials are assigned to each 
legislative report, very often participating in the frequent private meetings between the 
rapporteur and individual lobbyists. In addition they typically prepare their rapporteur 
for meetings with actors from other EU institutions; meetings that they would have 
taken a lead role in orchestrating, including the identification of appropriate 
participants (Winzen, 2011). These officials are also invariably involved in the many 
policy related side-events; attending alongside the more influential committee 
members, Commission officials and other well-established interests. Moreover, they 
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often play an active part in the increasingly decisive inter-institutional trialogues, as 
well as the many off-record discussions ahead of these meetings.  
Inevitably the extent to which officials become drawn into the legislative 
process is dependent on the rapporteur’s demand for policy information, which we 
know to be high, and an administrator’s willingness to supply such information. 
Certainly the official position of DG Internal Policies leaves administrators free in 
‘promoting and coordinating all activities relating to better law-making in Parliament’ 
(2010). Neuhold and Radulova (2006: 57) suggest that typically ‘committee staff not 
only provide scientific and technical information, but also give(s) advice on political 
issues’. Neunreither (2006: 49) illustrates this with the aid of an EP internal survey 
which showed that in over 80% of reports the secretariat provides assistance that is 
‘beyond technical and procedural questions’. Neuhold and Radulova (2006) also 
emphasise the role that committee assistants play in drafting reports, although they 
make clear that final responsibility remains with the rapporteur.  
Secretariat officials also occupy a prominent position during the committee’s 
open amendment stage. In addition to fulfilling the rapporteur’s demand for 
independent expertise, officials typically take the lead in preparing compromise 
agreements ahead of the vote (Winzen, 2011), thereby providing the rapporteur with a 
further opportunity to reset the agenda for the most highly contested aspects of the 
legislation. Thereafter, officials take responsibility for the order in which amendments 
appear on the voting list. Indeed, an official from the Environmental committee 
explained that ‘with large dossiers it can be quite difficult for [committee] members to 
place individual amendments in the context of the entire procedure’ (Interview, 18 
October 2007). The discretionary consequences of this action are difficult to assess, 
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but the potential exists to directly affect aspects of the committee’s final legislative 
report.13  
Yet, despite what might be considered a politicisation of an essentially 
bureaucratic function, previous research indicates that the secretariat operates in a 
politically unbiased fashion (Judge and Earnshaw, 2002; Corbett et al. 2007). Indeed 
secretariat officials are anxious to preserve their reputation for neutrality, as this 
underpins their policy role (Neunreither, 2006). Certainly the Code of Conduct is 
unambiguous on the issue of independence, stating that officials ‘shall neither seek nor 
take instructions from any government, authority, organisation or person outside his 
institution’(DG Internal Policies, 2010).  
Nevertheless, bias has been observed on the pro/anti integration dimension 
(Westlake, 1994). What is more, even though anecdotal accounts of political bias 
within particular EP directorates-general abound, the relationship between party 
affiliation and secretariat behaviour has escaped investigation. Although the persistent 
suggestion from the secretariat officials that were interviewed was that their party 
affiliation matters,14 with one apparently unaffiliated official claiming that her Head of 
                                            
13
 To illustrate this, the insertion of the words ‘if adopted all others fall’ against one of several 
amendments on a particular issue ensures that if a majority is reached for the ‘chosen’ amendment, the 
remainder will not be put to the vote. 
14
 To established whether political affiliation plays a part in the selection of committee administrators 
two direct questions were asked to 39 secretariat officials. Over a quarter of respondents (10/39) agreed 
that their ‘……appointment (was) influenced by party affiliation’, and almost one half (18/39) 
confirmed that ‘party affiliation plays a significant role in the recruitment of secretariat staff’. 
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Unit stated that ‘without party support your career options will be severely limited’ 
(Interview, 1 October 2009).  
A further unexplored avenue of potential bias is the career background of 
committee staff, given that a previous learning environment may have biased the 
accumulation of policy knowledge. Perhaps understandably, the EP does not divulge 
information regarding this. However, upon request the EP provides information on the 
significant and rising number of committee officials that are seconded from 
organisations that have an explicit interest in influencing the legislative outcome 
(13.4%, in the 6th parliament).  Although these seconded national experts (SNE) are 
formally subject to the same constraints as their permanent colleagues, it is apparent 
that they parachute in with a preformed legislative perspective. This gives them a 
knowledge advantage over many of their permanent colleagues. A situation that has 
been accentuated following the implementation of a mobility policy limiting time in 
office to 3-years (22 months in practice), which has had the unintended consequence of 
causing a severe loss to the secretariat’s institutional memory. This concern was 
expressed by an administrator from the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
Committee, who noted that ‘it is difficult to find anyone from within with an 
understanding or memory of the context in which a legislative discussion takes place’ 
(Interview, 19 November 2009). The number and duration of service of these two 
formal categories of secretariat official are detailed in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 Composition of the European Parliament’s Committee Secretariats in the 6th 
and 7th Parliaments 
 
 
 
To illustrate the potential for a conflict of interests, consider that in the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (Econ), SNEs (three out of the six serving 
officials), home organisations are consistently the central banks and national regulators 
of the three largest member states. These institutions are themselves amongst the most 
active lobbyists of the Econ committee. As such, it is not surprising that Lehmann 
(2009) suggested that a challenge remains to assess the impact of SNEs. Similarly, 
Pervenche Berès (Econ Committee Chair) commented that ‘the influence of national 
experts is a cause for serious concern, and we will need to look at what can be done’ 
(Interview, 1 December 2008). As well as highlighting the role of SNEs, these 
observations make clear that secretariat officials are in a position to influence 
legislative outcomes.  
 
3.4 Theoretical framework  
Rapporteurs are delegated a considerable opportunity to redefine their committee’s 
legislative agenda, and generally remain pivotal throughout the process. In order to 
fulfil this task in a credible yet strategically advantageous way, the rapporteur must 
Administrators 
(EU Civil 
Seconded National Experts                
(temporary administrators)
Number of staff 7th 102 18
6th 127 17
Average time served 7th 18 months 8 months
6th 22 months 14 months
                 Note: figures for the 7th parliament are for the 1st year 
                 Source: EP response to request, June 2010
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critically evaluate and verify information from across the policy spectrum over a short 
period of time. This means that the rapporteur must overcome legislative uncertainty 
derived from lobbyists’ competing claims, as well from the information contained in 
the Commission’s proposal. As a consequence, the rapporteur generates an exceptional 
demand for expert policy information. This information requirement is made in 
addition to the more general practice of simply ensuring that a given policy is 
compatible with the policy preferences of likeminded policy stakeholders. The 
rapporteur’s more complex demand for independent expert policy information, or at 
least independent relative to the available options, is principally fulfilled by officials 
assigned from the committee secretariat. However, although these officials adopt an 
independent approach, it turns out that they are policy generalists. Therefore, to fulfil 
the rapporteur’s demand as well as protect their own reputation, officials rapidly 
acquire information from entrenched interests. This provides the opportunity for 
selected interests to indirectly lobby the rapporteur, whilst limiting the scope for new 
independent information to enter the process via the secretariat. As a result, the 
information that secretariat officials supply to rapporteurs is endogenous to the 
lobbying process that they are asked to provide independent information on. What 
follows is a fuller specification of this framework, along with testable implications.      
The rapporteur receives policy information from lobbyists, seeking to change 
or defend aspects of the Commission’s legislative proposal, and is delegated the task of 
evaluating these submissions. The decision process takes into account the strategic fit 
between lobbyists’ requests for action, the position of the Commission, the probable 
position of the Council, and the rapporteur’s own policy objectives. These latter 
objectives represent the extent to which the rapporteur has adapted her own policy 
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position to take into account both the position of its party group and the overarching 
need to secure a sufficient committee majority.             
However, under conditions of uncertainty it remains unclear where rapporteurs 
turn for help for the evaluation of the plethora of often contradictory policy 
information, particularly given their extremely limited level of own resources. Here a 
distinction can be drawn between the requirements for objective and subjective advice. 
The demand for objective information is a function of rapporteurs’ agenda-setting role. 
The latter demand, which is shared by all committee members, is for subjective 
information that clarifies whether a particular policy prescription is consistent with a 
legislator’s own prior policy position. This demand is met by sources with policy 
preferences close to their own on salient policy dimensions, or at least from sources 
that they deem it unwise to ignore. Typically this information is provided by closely 
aligned organised interests, political parties, and national governments. But this 
relatively narrow policy perspective is insufficient for rapporteurs to assess the 
credibility and wider effects of policy options that are either not salient to friendly 
lobbyists or require a broader policy perspective in order to be in a position to forge 
minimum winning compromises between competing interests.  
It is objective policy information, i.e. trustworthy, independent and expert 
information that encompasses the breadth of the legislative dossier which underpins 
the agenda-setting power of the rapporteur. This information enables the presentation 
of a strategically advantageous report that is sufficiently acceptable to the committee 
majority. The accumulation of this type of information also serves to enhance the 
reputation of rapporteurs for policy expertise, which increases their political leverage 
both within their respective party groups and in subsequent negotiations with other 
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influential committee members. This demand is met primarily by the one or two 
officials assigned by the committee secretariat to a legislative report. The committee’s 
formal rules reinforce the perception of secretariat independence, with officials 
anxious to preserve this status. The expectation of the rapporteur is that by taking 
account of this independent and expert information, the level of policy uncertainty will 
be reduced, enabling them to effectively make otherwise difficult political choices. 
This leads to the following expectations: 
a rapporteur’s principal source for objectively verifying lobbyists’ information 
is the committee secretariat (H1); and 
rapporteurs assume that secretariat officials provide independent and expert 
policy advice (H2). 
It follows that rapporteurs are more likely to trust policy information provided 
by what is perceived to be an independent expert from the EP’s secretariat than from 
an unfamiliar lobbying source. This provides an incentive for organised interests to 
lobby officials from the committee secretariat. Organised interests, although free to 
lobby rapporteurs and other MEPs, will seize any opportunity to bias the rapporteur’s 
principal source for independent policy advice: the secretariat. Similarly, the 
Commission has an interest in limiting changes to its initial legislative proposal, but is 
constrained from entering into formal dialogue with MEPs until the report is finalised. 
As such Commission officials readily take the opportunity to indirectly lobby the 
rapporteur via the secretariat officials that they already have a working relationship 
with.  
Secretariat officials also have an incentive to engage with policy stakeholders. 
This is because, contrary to the expectations of rapporteurs, these officials are policy 
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generalists. Therefore to preserve their reputation for policy expertise they engage in a 
round of information catch-up. But, secretariat officials are not under the same 
obligation to demonstrate openness as MEPs and Commission officials. It is rather the 
case that these administrators restrict access in order to maintain their reputation for 
independence. As a result, they build relationships with policy actors in a cautious 
way. This privileges entrenched interests, especially regularly participating organised 
interests and Commission officials. Therefore, the following hypothesis should hold: 
secretariat officials are lobbied by both Commission officials and actively 
participating organised interests (H3). 
However, given that secretariat officials are eager to buttress their policy 
expertise, the relationships that they form with lobbyists are not simply one-way. 
Secretariat officials adopt a proactive stance, demanding information to overcome 
instances of policy uncertainty. As a result the position of entrenched interests is 
solidified, thereby limiting the scope for new information to enter the process. 
Therefore we should observe that: 
secretariat officials actively seek policy information from both Commission 
officials and actively participating organised interests (H4).  
The overall relationship is captured in Figure 3.1. The focus of attention is the 
rapporteur, given that they occupy a privileged agenda-setting role following the 
Commission’s legislative proposal. Here we observe that lobbyists mainly provide 
policy information directly to the rapporteur. However, at the same time a subset of the 
lobbying population along with the Commission also supply policy information to the 
secretariat. This information is filtered and repackaged as independent expert advice, 
thereby enabling the officials to fulfil the rapporteur’s demand. As a consequence, 
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rapporteurs’ independent source of policy expertise turns out to be part of the lobbying 
process that verification is required for.  
 
Figure 3.1  The rapporteur’s information sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Research design 
The process of indirect lobbying is particularly opaque. This is because unlike direct 
lobbying, where the actions of those on the receiving end may be determined, the 
activities of policy advisors are less readily discernable. Therefore, to explain the 
process, the only viable research strategy is based on information provided by policy 
actors. But despite this obvious constraint, it has been possible to synthesise two 
research approaches. An extensive programme of structured interviews, conducted by 
the author, is combined with a written questionnaire produced within the EP. The 
structured interviews were carried out in two waves; the first in the 6th parliament 
between 2007 and 2008, and then again in the 7th parliament during 2009 and 2010. 
The interviewees encompass political, institutional and societal actors. The 
Commission
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Lobbyists 
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Rapporteur
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questionnaire was conducted by Alexander Stubb MEP in September 2007, whilst 
acting as rapporteur for the European Transparency Initiative (Green Paper). The 
survey was sent to both institutional and political actors. 
In total 39 secretariat officials, 94 lobbyists and 34 MEPs/assistants gave up 
their time to participate. The 39 interviews with secretariat officials (AD category) 
encompassed all of the EP’s legislative committees, and included at least two 
administrators from each.The interviews with organised interests were with lobbyists 
defined as regular and prominent participants across three legislative committees:15 
Economic and Monetary Affairs; Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; and the 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection. The MEPs/assistants that participated were 
committee members from the same three committees, which together account for over 
a third of all co-decision reports; they were members of five different party groups, 
from 12 member states. The assistants to MEPs answered in respect to the activities of 
their MEPs. A further eight interviews were held with senior policy advisors from the 
three largest party group secretariats, which although too small a sample to report, 
remain a necessary source of additional corroboration.  
The questionnaire asked for responses to nine questions and was sent to both 
secretariat officials and MEPs. In total 80 MEPs and 31 secretariat officials responded. 
The completion of the questionnaire ahead of interviewing enabled three of the 
questions to be incorporated in the structured interviews, two with administrators and 
                                            
15
 The criteria for a lobbyist’s inclusion in the sample was identification by at least two actors from 
different sections of a policy community (average 3.01), i.e. MEP, secretariat official or an already 
established active lobbyist. 
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one with MEPs. As a result, the sample size that is reported for these questions is 66 
for administrators, and 114 for MEPs. 
 
3.6 Findings 
The theory places secretariat officials at the centre of a process of indirect lobbying. 
Integral to this system is the behaviour that has been ascribed to lobbyists, rapporteurs 
and committee administrators. These expectations, in the form of four hypotheses, are 
tested with the aid of interview and survey data from within these diverse sets of 
policy actors. 
The starting point for the analysis is the rapporteur’s demand for independent 
policy expertise. The expectation is that a rapporteurs’s principal source for 
objectively verifying lobbyists’ information is the committee secretariat (H1). This 
hypothesis is assessed primarily through a question from the questionnaire that was 
asked of MEPs, both interviewed and surveyed (n = 114). The MEPs were requested to 
specify their ‘main sources for checking information given by special interests?’.16 
They were asked to select any of the six specified categories that they felt were 
appropriate, with an option to specify ‘other’. The results, detailed in Figure 3.2, 
conform to the expectation that the committee secretariat represents MEPs’ principal 
venue for checking lobbyists’ information, with 72% of respondents making this 
choice. The second most cited source for corroborating lobbyists’ information was 
‘other interest representatives’ (63%). This finding remains consistent with the 
                                            
16
  When the question was posed to the interviewees, they were asked to answer in their capacity of 
rapporteur. This may account for the relatively high score awarded to secretariat officials. 
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theoretical expectation that MEPs seek subjective verification from sources that 
include closely aligned organised interests, whereas objective verification is sought 
from the independent secretariat.17   
 
Figure 3.2  MEPs self-defined sources for verifying lobbyists’ information    
 
To assess the expectation that rapporteurs assume that secretariat officials 
provide independent and expert policy advice (H2), the following questions were asked 
to all 34 MEPs that were interviewed: ‘do the administrators from the committee’s 
secretariat provide independent advice?’18 and ‘do the administrators from a 
                                            
17
 The results show that the internet is an important source of information, but the category is not 
sufficiently nuanced to consider more fully 
18
 Independent expertise was qualified by the term ‘relatively’, as prior to this interviewees invariably 
stated that no information source is independent. 
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committee’s secretariat provide expert advice?’. Respondents were asked to reply 
under the following headings: always, most of the time, some of the time, and never. 
The results for the two questions are displayed respectively in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In 
both cases they lend support to the hypothesis, with over two thirds of interviewees 
indicating that committee administrators provide them with ‘independent’ and ‘expert’ 
advice at least most of the time, with the largest response category for both questions 
indicating that this is always the case. 
 
Table 3.2  Do officials provide     Table 3.3 Do officials provide expert  
      independent advice?        advice? 
 
Given the size of the sample it is problematic to infer much more than this, but 
nevertheless the results suggest that rapporteurs recognise the expertise of committee 
administrators rather more than their independence. This might be indicative of 
awareness that these assistants pay a cost for their rapid acquisition of policy expertise.  
To put these responses in a wider context, two similar questions to those asked 
of the rapporteurs were posed to the population of lobbyists defined as ‘active 
participants’ in the policy process. The results are displayed in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
When they are compared with those from the rapporteurs, they indicate that lobbyists 
generally have a less favourable impression of secretariat officials’ work. This is 
particularly so with respect to policy expertise: over two thirds of respondents (68.3%) 
Always 13 Always 16
Most of the time 11 Most of the time 13
Some of the time 7 Some of the time 5 
Never 2 Never 0 
Unable to assess 1 Unable to assess 0 
Total 34 Total 34
Rapporteurs
 
Rapporteurs
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stated that this quality was lacking in the majority of officials. But taken together, the 
two sets of results are consistent with the argument that secretariat officials, although 
initially lacking in policy expertise (generalists), rapidly gain sufficient knowledge to 
retain their legitimacy with the rapporteur. In this respect Table 3.5 might be thought 
of as an ex ante representation of secretariat officials’ expertise.  
 
Table 3.4  Are secretariat officials       Table 3.5 Are secretariat officials            
independent?                  policy experts? 
Percentages are for respondents making an assessment  
 
However, the extent to which secretariat officials obtain and then apply their 
newfound expertise in an independent manner remains uncertain. Yet, this question is 
of enormous normative interest. From the rapporteur’s perspective, the indication is 
that the secretariat represents the most independent option available to obtain policy 
information. But, the extent to which this advice affects outcomes, although touched 
upon in this paper, remains open to future research. To set the scene, and to assess 
Neuhold and Radulova’s (2006) claim that on occasion officials draft entire legislative 
reports, this suggestion was put to the population of interviewed secretariat officials. 
The result was that over a quarter of officials (12/39) claimed to have entirely written 
at least one draft report on behalf of a rapporteur, with seven interviewees declining to 
give an answer. The same officials were asked about the consequences of their 
Yes 18 21.4% Yes 12 14.1%
Most of them 28 33.3% Most of them 15 17.6%
Some of them 26 31.0% Some of them 36 42.4%
No 12 14.3% No 22 25.9%
Unable to assess 10 Unable to assess 9
Total 94 100% Total 94 100%
    
  Lobbyists   
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discretionary authority to order amendments on the final voting lists. The interviewed 
officials overwhelmingly claimed (31/39) that through this role they are often 
instrumental in shaping aspects of final reports.19 
This leaves the question of how secretariat officials meet their demand for 
policy information. An indication of how this demand is met is provided through the 
expectation that secretariat officials are lobbied by both Commission officials and 
actively participating organised interests (H3). If this is the case, and we assume that 
lobbyists including the Commission allocate their resources rationally, then there must 
be a real chance that through lobbying the secretariat the content of the rapporteur’s 
report will be affected. This hypothesis was assessed in two ways. Firstly, the 94 
actively participating lobbyists were asked: 
‘with regard to the co-decision legislation that your organisation has been 
involved with, what percentage of your legislative concerns that you raised 
with the rapporteur were you also able to convey to the committee 
secretariat?’20 
The results are summarised in Table 3.6. They indicate that when lobbyists 
were asked to recall their legislative concerns that they raised with the rapporteur, the 
majority of respondents (77.7%) stated that they had more often than not made the 
relevant committee official aware. 
 
                                            
19
 Secretariat officials were asked ‘is it common that the way in which you choose to order the voting lists affects 
the outcome of the final report?’ Five administrators declined to answer.  
20
 It became clear that secretariat administrators are often present when rapporteurs are lobbied.  
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Table 3.6  Percentage of information that lobbyists conveyed to rapporteurs that they 
also conveyed to the secretariat 
 
To further verify this hypothesis, the secretariat officials that were interviewed 
were asked: ‘during the preparation of a draft report that has been assigned to you, 
how often are you contacted by organised interests that are seeking to influence your 
opinion?’ This question was repeated with the words ‘organised interests’ substituted 
for ‘Commission official’. Of the 39 interviewees, 32 gave a response to the two 
questions. The average number of lobbying contacts was 52.6, with responses ranging 
from 4.5 to 100.21 The average number of Commission lobbying contacts was 25.6, 
with a range of 10 to 50. It is apparent from these figures that committee 
administrators are frequently lobbied by both the Commission and outside interests. 
The survey approached the organised interest aspect of this issue by asking 
administrators: ‘on average, how often are you contacted by special interests?’ The 
average was three times per week which, if we assume that there are 40 effective 
                                            
21
 Respondents often gave a range, for example 20-25. In these instances the median was taken.  
 
 
Lobbyists 
Percentage of 
respondents making 
an assessment 
Above 75% 43 50.6% 
More than 50%, but less than 75% 23 27.1% 
Less than 50%, but more than 25% 12 14.1% 
25% or less 7 8.2% 
Unable to assess 9 
Total 94 100% 
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weeks in a year, then we are looking at perhaps 120 lobbying contacts. This seems 
broadly comparable to the responses given by the interviewees, given that secretariat 
officials would normally oversee two to three reports per year. 
Further evidence for the value of lobbying the secretariat is provided by the 
growing prevalence of SNEs within the secretariat staff, given that it is reasonable to 
assume that their home organisations anticipate a policy benefit for the loan of their 
experienced staff. This suggests that a form of indirect ‘legislative subsidy’ may be 
taking place, with sponsoring organisations acutely aware of the value of both direct 
and indirect pathways to influence EP committees. 
The final element in the puzzle is the establishment that secretariat officials 
actively seek policy information from both Commission officials and actively 
participating organised interests (H4). To assess this condition, the same question that 
has been reported for MEPs was asked to secretariat officials: ‘what are the main 
sources for checking information given by special interests?’. The results, detailed in 
Figure 3.3, confirm the expectation that secretariat officials’ two main sources for 
verifying lobbyists’ information are the Commission (80%) and other interest 
representatives (48.5%). This further conveys the sense that indirect lobbying is a 
process of recycling the same policy information.  
The results also show that secretariat officials (39.4%) regularly seek policy 
information from their colleagues. This finding is particularly interesting in light of the 
discussion on SNEs as an indirect form of ‘legislative subsidy’. In addition 27.3% of 
respondents added the category ‘national representations’, as a source of information. 
This finding, although unexpected, remains consistent with the expectations for 
indirect lobbying, and is indicative of closed policy-making.  
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Figure 3.3  Secretariat officials’ sources for verifying lobbyists’ information  
  
3.7 Conclusion 
The analysis has yielded additional insights into decision-making in the EU, revealing 
an alternative and indirect pathway to influence the rapporteur. It has been shown that 
secretariat officials play an often important role in the legislative process, but rather 
than serving as the source of independent policy expertise, they act as conduits for the 
interests of entrenched policy actors. As a consequence, it turns out that the 
independent advice sought and received by rapporteurs in order to overcome policy 
uncertainty is in fact endogenous to the lobbying process they seek to illuminate. This 
suggests that there may be only limited opportunity for unbiased expert knowledge to 
enter the legislative process during the EP’s draft report stage. This is particularly so, 
given that Boswell’s (2008) analysis of the Commission phase indicates that if 
independent expertise is incorporated into the initial proposal, it is likely to be as a 
means of reinforcing exogenous formed policy positions. 
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The EP’s formal committee rules create the conditions that enable indirect 
lobbying to flourish. It is the delegation and concentration of early stage agenda-setting 
power in the hands of a single inadequately resourced individual that generates the 
exceptional need for objective policy information. Secretariat officials, as the best 
available option, meet this demand which remains commensurate with their formal 
duties. This sets in train a parallel and largely unseen process of information catch-up. 
It follows, that for entrenched interests, i.e. actively participating lobbyists and 
Commission officials, the secretariat represents an additional and viable pathway to 
seek legislative influence by biasing the rapporteur’s source of independent expert 
policy advice. These channels are contingent on informational asymmetries between 
policy stakeholders and the rapporteur, or at least the latter’s perception of such. But in 
addition, there is likely to be variation in the extent to which rapporteurs seek 
independent expertise from committee administrators and to which officials are willing 
to meet this demand. 
The analysis shows that in the main, secretariat officials opt to act as adjuncts 
to a rapporteur’s limited staff. This raises the question of the extent to which seconded 
national experts are, in effect providing a direct legislative subsidy to the rapporteur, 
although in contrast to Hall and Deardorff (2006) perhaps to an unwitting recipient. 
This issue highlights the downside of imposing strict limits to the time bureaucrats 
remain in office, which with some irony was designed to prevent the cosy dominance 
of entrenched policy actors. The clear effect on the secretariat has been a loss to both 
its institutional memory and level of in-house policy expertise, thereby increasing the 
influence of lobbyists and privileging the position of SNEs.    
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Demands for increased openness in the relationship between organised interests 
and both legislators and bureaucrats feature prominently in the debate over transparent 
governance. This was the case in the European Transparency Initiative (2005), where 
lobbying regulation was the most prominent theme of the three-pronged reform. Here 
attention was particularly focussed on the relationship between the Commission 
bureaucracy and outside interests. Within the EP, attention has naturally been placed 
on the relationship between elected officials and lobbyists. Yet the relationship 
between the EP’s bureaucracy and elected officials has been largely ignored. This 
paper has demonstrated that any future regulation of lobbying activity within the EP 
should pay attention to the role and consequences of indirect lobbying.  
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4  Explaining Interest Group Interactions with MEPs: Dominant 
Party Groups, Coalition Formation and Committee Membership 
 
4.1 Abstract  
This paper contributes to our understanding of how the European Parliament’s (EP) 
decision-making process shapes interest group interactions with legislators. Interest 
groups’ behaviour is highly conditional on two motivations: lobby powerful MEPs, 
and lobby friendly MEPs. Friendliness is based on ideology, with power shaped by 
institutional rules and seat share. These goals can mutually reinforce each other. 
However, because these two motivations exist, and because political power is not fully 
predictable, there are also strong incentives for interest groups to lobby non-natural 
allies. Through this action they ensure that their policy information reaches the 
winning side. But crucially, it is shown that when interest groups engage in this 
behaviour, they retain their preference to lobby those closest to themselves 
ideologically. The mode of decision-making is such that these interactions are played 
out within committee, with the imperative to lobby the rapporteur regardless of her 
party epitomising the ascribed behaviour. The analysis is carried out on nine policy-
related categories of interest group, with MEP data from three parliaments (1999-
2011) combined with information on the parliamentary role of 724 respondents.  
 
Keywords: Committees, European Parliament, Party Groups. 
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4.2 Introduction 
The motivation behind interest groups’ incentive to lobby particular Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs), whilst increasingly understood (Kohler-Koch, 
1998; Wessels, 1999; Bouwen, 2004; Eising, 2007; Mahoney, 2008; Marshall, 2010), 
does not yet amount to a unified explanation. As such, the challenge for interest group 
research is to more fully interact with the larger and relatively developed body of 
legislative literature. Through adopting this approach, the paper addresses several of 
the more salient areas of uncertainty in the lobbying literature, offering a cohesive 
explanation for the determinants of interest groups’ choice of lobbying target. Central 
to the investigation is the effect of institutional constraints on interest groups’ 
otherwise dominant strategic behaviour. 
The analysis highlights several obstacles to our understanding of interest 
groups’ strategic behaviour, each relating directly to the European Parliament’s (EP) 
decision-making process. In particular, the effects of party group membership on 
lobbying behaviour are largely unexplained. This is surprising given that we know that 
party groups are an important factor in explaining legislative outcomes within the EP 
(Attinà, 1990; Hix and Lord, 1997; Raunio, 1997; Hix et al, 2006). Similarly, much of 
the more recent interest group literature makes the implicit assumption that lobbying 
MEPs is contingent upon their membership of a germane committee (Bowen, 2004; 
Marshall, 2010), yet the empirical foundations for this claim are disputed (Eising, 
2007). In a similar vein, the extent to which the transitory but highly influential 
position of rapporteur affects a committee member’s relative viability as a lobbying 
target has been only partially explored (Mahoney, 2008; Marshall, 2010). Finally, 
although research indicates that MEPs engagement with the legislative process is 
87 
 
positively correlated with their level of policy influence (Kreppel, 2002; Yoshinaka et 
al, 2010), the effect on lobbying behaviour remains to be fully explained. 
The theoretical framework to address these questions is underpinned by two 
straightforward assumptions. Interest groups seek to influence policy outcomes; and, at 
the core of their strategic behaviour is the calculation that to achieve a desirable policy 
outcome, it is more effective to lobby legislators that are natural allies than those that 
are likely to be against their policy position. These assumptions are compatible with 
the consensus in the literature which suggests that legislators with broadly congruent 
policy preferences to a given interest group are more likely to make successful policy 
advocates (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 
1998).  
However, the analysis demonstrates the limits that the EP’s institutional 
arrangements impose on this otherwise optimal behaviour. Here several mechanisms 
are identified. Firstly, the EP’s rules of procedure position European party groups at 
the centre of the political web, and in particular privilege the largest party families. 
Secondly, since there is no permanent voting majority in the EP, decision-making is 
contingent on the formation of several possible voting coalitions which must contain at 
least two of the three largest political groups. Thirdly, the EP’s strong committee 
system provides the opportunity for members to exert considerably more influence 
over their committee’s legislative output than non-members. Finally, the legislative 
process is sufficiently complicated that it privileges sustained engagement by MEPs. 
This activity, as well as providing a direct opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process, can over time contribute positively to a legislator’s reputation, thereby 
magnifying the impact of future participation. 
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The expectation for the effect of these institutionally imposed conditions on 
interest groups’ strategic behaviour is that lobbying attention will be concentrated on 
the most influential legislators: members of the largest party groups; members of 
policy relevant committees; and in particular the more active MEPs. However, all of 
these categories pose challenges to the assumption that interest groups lobby their 
natural allies. Amongst the most influential committee members are the rapporteurs, 
but here there is no guarantee that these gatekeepers will be sympathetic.  But with no 
viable alternative options, it is anticipated that interest groups will be willing to violate 
their preference to lobby friends in favour of their preference to influence policy 
outcomes. In the case of the largest party groups, the expectation for interest group 
behaviour is that they factor in the potential for the party group that most closely 
represents their policy goals to be excluded from the winning majority on any given 
vote. This means that in order to ensure they build a relationship with members of the 
winning coalition they are prepared to lobby members of unfriendly parties. But in 
contrast to the decision to lobby the rapporteur, there are lobbying options, albeit 
constrained. As such, when interest groups lobby members of unfriendly parties they 
lobby the most sympathetic members of the population of otherwise off-limits party 
members.  
These ideas are examined through several sources of information, including 
responses by MEPs to surveys carried out by the European Parliamentary Research 
Group (EPRG) during the 5th, 6th and 7th parliaments (Farrell et al, 2011). This 
information is combined with parliamentary data on the activities of the 724 MEPs that 
responded to the surveys (Høyland et al, 2009). The starting point for the analysis was 
selected to coincide with the point that the EP can unambiguously be described as a co-
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legislature alongside the Council, following the reform and extension of the co-
decision procedure (Crombez, 2001).  
The following section of the paper synthesises salient aspects of our knowledge 
about the role of both European party groups and the EP’s committee system, with the 
literature explaining the pattern and causal mechanism of organised interests’ 
interactions with MEPs. Together this investigation underpins the theoretical 
expectations and testable hypotheses presented in the second section. The 
methodological approach is set out in the third, including a clear explanation of the 
variables later used. Thereafter, the results are presented in two blocs, with the first 
reporting the effects of committee rules, followed by an assessment of the role of 
party.  
 
4.3 Party groups, Committees and Lobbying in the European 
Parliament 
European party groups play a vital role in structuring political debate and 
coalition formation in the EP (Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002). Indeed, the rules of 
procedure were designed to facilitate this outcome. This is not to say that national 
parties are unimportant, because in instances of policy conflict MEPs’ loyalty towards 
their national party invariably takes precedence (see Whitaker 2011, for a discussion of 
the role of national parties within committees). However, with increasingly high levels 
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of vote cohesion within the large party groups, it is clear that these occasions are far 
from the norm (Hix and Noury, 2010).22  
The reason for the increased tendency for party groups to vote on bloc appears 
to be a consequence of the growth in the EP’s institutional power rather than a function 
of ideological congruence (Raunio, 1997; Hix et al, 2007).23 Each new treaty since the 
implementation of the Single European Act (1987) has given the EP more power, 
which has led party groups to increase the incentives for their members to adhere to the 
party whip. Members are rewarded for their loyalty through promotions to particular 
committees (McElroy, 2006), as well with the assignment of important legislative 
reports (Hausemer, 2006).24  
The inclusion of at least two of the three largest political groups, i.e. the 
European Peoples Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES),25 or the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), is essential for a winning 
coalition to form in plenary. This is because to date no party has secured a majority of 
seats, and with no government to support there is no necessity for permanent coalitions 
                                            
22
 Hix & Noury (2009) note that the voting records of the EP’s main party groups is more cohesive than 
the Democrats and Republicans in Congress.  
23
 Ideological congruence within the principal party groups has actually diminished with successive 
enlargements. 
24
 Ringe (2010) rejects this notion of hierarchical control and suggests that party group cohesion is 
simply a product of the committee decision-making process.  
25
 In the 7th parliament, in order to incorporate the Italian Margarita Party, the PES party group became 
the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. However, for simplicity the PES/S&D group will 
be referred to as simply the PES.   
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to be formed. Although in the past there was a tendency for ‘grand coalitions’ to form 
between the PES and the EPP, these have become less common since the early 1990s, 
and by the 6th parliament the two largest parties voted independently with the liberals 
more often than they did with each other (Hix and Høyland, 2011). This trend towards 
fluidity in coalition formation is facilitated in part by the rapid increase in first reading 
agreements, which do away with the need to form oversize majorities.  
This analysis makes clear that party groups are at the centre of decision making 
in the EP, yet research on interest group behaviour has largely overlooked the role of 
parties. The exception is Wessels’ (1999) study conducted during the 4th parliament, 
which tackled the issue through a two-dimensional map illustrating the density of 
exchanges between specific categories of interest group and European party groups. 
Three alignments were identified: a ‘bourgeois alliance’, associating business interests 
with Liberal, Christian Democrat, and Conservative party groups; a ‘labour alliance’, 
linking trade unions with Communists and Socialist party groups; and an ‘alliance of 
the weak’, connecting environmental and consumer interests with Green and radical 
party groups.  
Although this focus on party groups remains to be built upon, some important 
contributions have been made in explaining how organised interests discriminate 
between MEPs based upon their policy preferences. The question of whether it is 
strategically advantageous for interest groups to lobby legislators who are known to be 
unsympathetic to their cause has received attention. This approach is rooted in the 
Congressional literature, where this once live debate appears settled: organised 
interests hardly ever lobby their opponents; they occasionally interact with those yet to 
decide; but, overwhelmingly, they lobby their legislative allies (Baumgartner and 
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Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998). To account for this 
perhaps counterintuitive strategic behaviour, the signalling literature stresses the 
importance of a lobbyist’s reputation for providing good quality policy information in 
overcoming information asymmetries (Berry, 1998; Parker, 2004). The implication is 
that such a reputation is built over time, and is more likely to be fostered with 
likeminded policy makers.   
Crombez’s (2002) model of these interactions within the EP suggests that at the 
proposal stage organised interests attempt to influence policy makers that hold similar 
preferences to their own. Their aim is to create fully conversant advocates. The 
expectation for the vote stage is that the lobbying focus switches towards MEPs that 
occupy pivotal positions.  
However, a contrasting explanation to both Crombez’s model and the US 
experience has been put forward to show that organised interests often lobby their 
opponents at the proposal stage, although thereafter they almost always lobby their 
friends (Marshall, 2010). The explanation for these contradictory findings is that the 
latter study incorporated institutional features of the EP’s committee system, which 
significantly differ from that of Congressional committees and are absent from 
Crombez’s model. The analysis showed that the formal rules are such that early stage 
agenda-setting power is concentrated in the hands of a single rapporteur, thereby 
severely constraining lobbyists’ choice of viable target. What is more, the rapporteur 
has a strategic incentive to take account of certain opposing positions in her report in 
order to forge a winning committee majority. In subsequent stages of the process 
interest groups are less constrained, allowing them to lobby their friends. However, by 
drawing upon insights from the signalling literature it is shown that although friends 
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are lobbied during the open amendment stage, the decision to lobby highly influential 
friends remains contingent on the quality of an organised interest’s information.   
The relevance of committee membership to interest group behaviour was 
highlighted by Wessels (1999) through a further two-dimensional analysis, this time 
with party group replaced by EP committee. Committee membership was not directly 
linked to an interest group category, but nevertheless four broad contact patterns were 
identified: consumer interests; industrial interests; trade and transport interests; and 
agriculture and fisheries. However, more recent research carried out during the 6th 
parliament found that in the case of business interests, committee membership made 
no significant difference to the likelihood of an MEP being lobbied (Eising, 2007).   
This is surprising given that the EP’s institutional structure has evolved in such 
a way that its policy output has become increasingly defined through the scrutiny 
carried out by its 20 standing committees (Corbett et al, 2005). This trend has 
accelerated following the implementation of the Amsterdam treaty (1999), which made 
it possible for co-decision legislation to be finalised in the first reading. The effect has 
been to facilitate de facto legislative agreements between EP committees and the 
Council prior to the first reading in plenary, thereby privileging committees (Farrell 
and Héritier, 2003; Häge and Kaeding, 2007) and in particular the rapporteurs 
(Héritier, 2007; Costello and Thompson, 2010).26 As such, the EP’s inter-institutional 
negotiating position invariably reflects the policy agreed within committee, which is 
reached through a simple majority of attending members.  
                                            
26
 To date, no co-decision agreement made in trialogue has been rejected in plenary.  
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The EP’s rules of procedure specify that ‘the composition of committees shall, 
as far as possible, reflect the composition of Parliament’ (Rule 177; 2010). This has 
been shown to be the case in regard to nationality, party group membership, and 
ideology (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009). Where 
committee composition deviates from this principle, it is in the intensity of members’ 
commitment to the policy issue. Of particular relevance is Yordonova’s (2009) finding 
that MEPs are more likely to join a committee that covers a policy area with salience 
to special interests that they are already associated with. 
The institutional framework is constructed in such a way that for a committee 
member to exert particular legislative influence, sustained engagement with the policy 
process is required. This was found to be the case in the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs committee, where the majority of successful amendments were proposed by a 
subset of highly active non-office holding MEPs (Marshall, 2010). This relationship is 
reflected in the allocation of legislative reports, where MEPs’ relative level of activity 
in plenary votes is one of several explanatory factors (Kreppel, 2002; Yoshinaka et al, 
2010).  
A further strand of interest group research has addressed the intra-institutional 
dimension. Here Bouwen (2002) focused on the differential demands for information 
from the EU’s main institutions, as manifested through their preference for specific 
organisation forms of business interests. In the case of the EP, the expected primary 
demand was for information that aggregated the interests of all member states, which 
was anticipated to be provided by European peak associations. The results, based upon 
27 MEPs involved in the area of financial services, were in the expected direction 
although the difference between European associations and national associations was 
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actually marginal (Bouwen, 2004). Here the relative importance of the EP’s committee 
system is not questioned but rather assumed. Eising’s (2007) analysis, whilst 
supportive of the primacy of European associations, placed far greater emphasis on 
both the relevance of business interests’ perception of the EP as an important 
institution, and their relative level of financial resource. The implication is that if 
access to MEPs is sought, increasing the frequency of contacts comes at a cost.   
This brief review has highlighted the increasingly decisive role that both the 
committee system and the largest party groups play in defining the EP’s legislative 
position. The relationship between these two institutional forms is one of 
interdependence. Party authority and hence power is at least partially contingent upon 
their control of committee spoils; in particular the supply of legislative reports 
(rapporteurships) and membership itself. At the same time committee power, which is 
delegated from the committee floor, is contingent on the support of a winning coalition 
that must include two or more of the largest party groups. As such it is puzzling that 
party groups barely feature in the lobbying literature, and that the relevance of MEPs’ 
committee membership to interest group behaviour remains ambiguous. It is also 
surprising that the trend in the literature has been to focus solely on the activities of 
business interests instead of generalising these findings across the wider lobbying 
population.  
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4.4 Explaining interest group interactions 
Interest groups are alert to the decision-making process in the EP. They observe the 
passage of legislation at close quarters. It is therefore expected that they will adapt 
their strategic behaviour to take account of the nature of winning coalition formation 
and the presence of strong legislative committees.  
As such, interest groups will concentrate their lobbying attention on active 
members of the three largest party groups. In particular members that belong to a 
policy-relevant committee are preferred to non-members, and amongst these agenda-
setters are targeted above ordinary members. However, lobbying of the three dominant 
party groups is not confined to members that are from the most closely aligned party, it 
is also systematically directed towards members of party groups that are least aligned 
to their policy preferences. But crucially, in this action they pick out the ‘friendliest’ 
members from a relatively unfriendly grouping. What follows is a more explicit 
development of these ideas.   
4.41 Committee membership  
The relevance of committee membership to lobbyists’ strategic behaviour is 
straightforward to understand, although it remains to be fully examined. Essentially 
committee members are likely to exert greater influence over related policy outcomes 
than non-members, thereby increasing their potential value to interest groups seeking 
to influence policies within this sphere. The resultant propensity to target committee 
members is likely to have accelerated in line with the growing importance of EP 
committees to the final legislative outcome. As such, we should observe a more 
systematic allocation of interest groups’ lobbying effort than is indicated by Wessels’ 
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(1999) pre-Amsterdam analysis, thereby directly addressing the uncertainty thrown up 
by Eising’s (2007) contrasting findings:  
H1. Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are members of a 
committee  with responsibility for their area of policy concern than non-
members. 
This apparent restriction to the field of viable lobbying targets remains 
conducive for interest groups to maintain their instinctive strategy of lobbying natural 
allies. This is because committee membership closely resembles the composition of the 
plenary (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009). Therefore, 
rather than constraining lobbying choice, the effect of committee membership is 
simply to provide interest groups with a road map to influential MEPs with a strong 
interest in their policy area.  
Committee rules, both formal and informal, provide for a considerable 
delegation of agenda-setting and negotiating authority to individual rapporteurs. Their 
legislative reports form the agenda for the committee debate, and typically the 
rapporteur plays an active role in constructing committee wide agreements. Once the 
report is adopted in committee they take the lead in both plenary debates and in the 
now crucial inter-institutional negotiations (trialogues). The expectation is that because 
of the extraordinary pivotal position that rapporteurs occupy, they represent 
‘irresistible’ lobbying targets. As such, interest groups are prepared if necessary to 
violate their normal strategic principal of lobbying legislative allies in favour of 
attempting to influence these agenda-setters. This approach is facilitated by 
rapporteurs’ high demand for policy information, and the need to incorporate certain 
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otherwise unpalatable policy preferences into their report in order to secure its safe 
passage (Benedetto, 2005; Marshall, 2010). This leads to the following expectations: 
H2. Interest groups’ principal lobbying target is the rapporteur; and,  
H3. Interest groups lobby the rapporteur even when she is not a natural ally.     
The relative level of legislative participation undertaken by an MEP is an 
important factor in determining their level of influence (Kreppel, 2002; Marshall, 
2010; and Yoshinaka et al, 2010). Interest groups put themselves in a position to 
observe legislators relative level of participation in debates, side-events and in voting. 
Their differentiation of MEPs’ performance is of course made easier because the least 
active/effective members fail to show-up, and are less likely to be available to lobby. 
Therefore, we should observe that:    
H4. Interest groups are more likely to lobby committee members 
                        that are active in parliament. 
Some preliminary evidence for the above hypotheses is provided below in 
Figure 4.1.27 This plots the frequency of lobbying contacts reported by MEPs (jittered) 
in four policy sectors across participation, differentiating between membership of the 
relevant EP committee and a base category (non-committee member). There appears to 
be a distinguishable pattern both across levels of participation as well as between 
committee members and non-committee members which will be tested formally in the 
results section. 
 
                                            
27
 The variables for both figures 1 & 3 are fully explained in the Data section. These figures are 
presented as an early non-parametric indication of the relationship between some of the variables.  
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Figure 4.1  Lobbying Committee Members and Activity in Parliament 
 
 
4.42 European Party Groups   
Given the central role played by the political groups in both assignments and decision-
making, it would be extraordinary if interest groups’ lobbying decisions were party 
blind. Here the ‘elephant in the room’ is the dominant position held by the three main 
party groups:  EPP, PES, and ALDE. The effect of their hold on decision-making is to 
constrain interest groups’ choice of viable parties to lobby. For example, interest 
groups which in other circumstances may not be drawn to these pro-integration centrist 
parties have a strategic incentive to redirect at least part of their lobbying effort to 
parties at the centre of coalition formation, both formal (voting) and informal 
(comprise agreements). Therefore, it is anticipated that: 
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H5. MEPs from the three dominant party groups are lobbied more  
                  often than members from other party families. 
This interpretation just about remains consistent with two of Wessels’ (1999) 
three categories of party/interest group alignments: ‘bourgeois alliance’ and ‘labour 
alliance’. It also allows for a constrained version of the ‘lobbying your friends’ 
orthodoxy to hold (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and 
Kimball, 1998).  
However, the fluid nature of winning coalition formation has an additional 
effect on interest groups’ strategic behaviour. They intentionally engage in lobbying 
MEPs from the least friendly of the dominant political groups. The reason for this 
surprising yet theoretically consistent behaviour is that unlike most national 
parliaments, where voting coalitions are broadly stable and therefore known in 
advance, in the EP it is uncertain which party groups will be on the winning side. This 
creates a powerful incentive for interest groups to ‘hedge their bets’ and divert at least 
some of their lobbying effort away from the party group that they are naturally more 
associated with to a party that is a non-natural ally.  
This latter activity is at odds with Wessels’ interpretation of interest group 
behaviour, which can be thought of in part as a lobbyist’s unconstrained default 
position. But when fully specified this activity remains consistent with the underlying 
assumption that interest groups seek to lobby their friends. This is because when for 
strategic reasons an unfriendly party is lobbied, interests groups apply their normal 
operating logic but in this case within the population of non-friendly party members 
and lobby the friendliest of this subset. As such we should observe:    
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H6. When interest groups attempt to influence dominant party groups that are 
naturally less supportive, they lobby those members with relatively close policy 
preferences. 
An initial impression of this relationship is set out in Figure 4.2. The 
assumption is that producer interests, i.e. banking/insurance and transport groups, are 
naturally more closely aligned to EPP members than they are to members of the (left of 
centre) PES. Similarly it is assumed that the opposite relationship holds for civil 
society interests, i.e. consumer and environmental groups. Again the frequency of 
lobbying across four committees is plotted, but this time in relation to a left/right 
ideological measure for members of the corresponding non-naturally aligned party 
group. The predicted lobbying counts, whilst seemingly consistent with H6, will be 
formally assessed in the results section. 
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Figure 4.2  Lobbying members of ‘unfriendly’ Party Groups 
 
 
4.5 The Data 
Testing the hypotheses represents a challenge given that lobbying is a phenomenon 
that is not directly observed, and as a consequence there is no available data. To 
address this problem the analysis incorporates responses to several large scale surveys, 
which includes MEPs’ self-reported contacts with lobbyists. Overall the analysis draws 
on several sources of MEP data covering three European Parliaments (1999-2004; 
2004-2009; and 2009-14). The population under analysis is defined by responses to 
three surveys of MEPs (2000, 2006, and 2010) conducted by the EPRG (Farrell, 2011). 
The number of individual observations is 724 (35%), out of a possible 2,094 MEPs 
that were in office at the time the respective surveys were conducted. The sample of 
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MEPs for each survey is comparable, and reasonably representative of the EP as a 
whole in terms of party group membership and nationality (Hix et al, 2011). The 
survey results provide information on MEPs’ contacts with specific categories of 
interest group, on their policy opinions and on the self-assessment of their ideological 
position. Information on MEPs’ seniority and committee membership was obtained 
from Høyland et al’s (2009) MEP database, with the remaining data collected via the 
EP’s website.    
The dependent variables are the number of contacts that MEPs report to have 
had with nine categories of interest group.28 There are six possible responses to this 
question which are coded in the manner previously adopted by Wessels (1999). 
Responses of ‘at least once a week’ are taken as 52 on an annual basis; ‘at least once a 
month’ as 12; ‘at least every three months’ as 4; ‘at least once a year’ as 1; with both 
‘less often’ and ‘no contact’ represented as 0. The questionnaire, although defining 11 
interest group policy sectors, asked respondents to answer for both national and 
European group variants for 10 of these categories. However, with the paper’s focus on 
lobbying within specific policy arenas, this distinction serves only to muddy the 
waters. Therefore these variants have been combined, allowing a clearer picture of 
MEPs interaction across policy sectors to emerge.29 The independent variables are as 
follows: 
                                            
28
 Two categories of interest group have been excluded from the analysis because it is not immediately apparent 
which committees provide a good policy fit.   
29
 This means that there are 13 possible values that these variables can take: 0, 1, 4, 5, 12, 13, 16, 24, 52, 56, 64, and 
108. 
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Committee membership: this is a dummy variable. Committees are included 
based on their responsibility for a given policy sector, as defined by its occurrence 
within the set of dependent variables. With committee responsibilities sometimes 
shifting between parliaments, these changes have been tracked. This means that 
committee definitions refer to the policy sector. For example, consumer interests were 
combined with Environmental policy in the 5th parliament, but became part of IMCO 
in the 6th and 7th parliaments. Here the discussion and analysis refers to the committee 
with responsibility for consumer interests.30 This means that the categories are not 
exclusive, with committees generally encompassing additional policy areas. The 
direction of any misalignment is such that the results presented are unlikely to 
overstate the effect. The assignment of committees is detailed in Table 4.1. The timing 
of each survey facilitated the analysis, as this came ahead of the mid-term reallocation 
of committee membership. The status of committee substitutes proved more 
problematic. This is because many of them are amongst the more prominent committee 
members,31 yet it appears that more commonly substitutes play a less meaningful part 
in a committee’s life. To reconcile this, committee substitutes are taken to be de facto 
members if they have written a legislative report, thereby demonstrating a high level of 
engagement with the committee. 
 
                                            
30
 As a consequence the committees on Budget, Budgetary Control and Employment & Social Affairs 
are excluded from the analysis. 
31
 Yoshinaka et al (2010) note that for the 4th and 5th parliaments, 15% and 14% of all reports were 
assigned to committee substitutes. 
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Table 4.1 The assignment of interest group categories 
 
Rapporteur: this continuous variable picks up the frequency that a committee member 
acts as rapporteur in a particular committee within a given parliament for either the 
Co-decision or consultation procedures.32 
Participation: This measures MEPs attendance at plenary (roll-call) voting sessions, 
for the appropriate parliament; it is coded between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating 100% 
                                            
32
 Procedures in which the EP has relatively little legislative power were excluded from the analysis. 
This task was made easier by the exclusion of the committee on Budgetary Affairs, and its associated 
procedures. The Consultation procedure was included in the analysis following Kardasheva’s (2009) 
insight that the EP often exerts significant influence. 
Interest Groups Categories Relevant Committee by Parliamentary Term 
1999-2004 2004-2009 2009-
Consumer groups Environment, Public 
Health, Food Safety, 
Consumer Affairs  
Internal Mkt 
&Consumer Affairs 
(IMCO)
Internal Mkt 
&Consumer Affairs 
(IMCO) 
Environmental groups Environment, Public 
Health, Food Safety, 
Consumer Affairs  
Environment, Public 
Health & Food Safety
Environment, Public 
Health & Food Safety
Women's organisations Women's. Rights & 
Gender Equality
Women's. Rights & 
Gender Equality
Women's. Rights & 
Gender Equality 
Agriculture & Fisheries groups Agriculture & Rural 
Develop '+' Fisheries
Agriculture & Rural 
Develop '+' Fisheries
Agriculture & Rural 
Develop '+' Fisheries
Industry organisations Industry, Research, 
Energy and Trade
Industry, Research, 
Energy '+' IMCO
Industry, Research, 
Energy '+' IMCO 
Transport groups Transport, Tourism & 
Regional Policy
Transport & Tourism Transport & Tourism
Trade/Commerce associations Industry, Research, 
Energy and Trade
International Trade International Trade
Banking and Insurance groups Economic & Monetary 
Affairs
Economic & Monetary 
Affairs
Economic & Monetary 
Affairs
Human rights groups Foreign Affairs  '+' Civil 
Liberties, JHA 
Foreign Affairs  '+' Civil 
Liberties, JHA 
Foreign Affairs  '+' Civil 
Liberties, JHA 
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attendance. The mean for the sample is 0.8 (80%), which is somewhat higher than the 
population mean of 0.73 (73%).33  
Left/Right self-placement: this variable measures an MEP’s perception of his or her 
ideological position on a 10-point left/right spectrum: extreme left = 1, and extreme 
right = 10.34   
Party dummies: for the four largest European party groups, i.e. EPP, PES, ALDE and 
the Green party, so all other party groups form the reference category.   
Opinions (on specific policies): MEPs responses to policy questions that have a good 
fit to five of the nine dependant variable categories are reported. There are two distinct 
question formats, with the first asking MEPs if they ‘think there should be more or less 
EU regulation in the following [two] areas’: ‘environmental protection standards’; and 
‘discrimination’ (on the grounds of gender, race, religion, age disability, and sexual 
orientation). The second question type asked MEPs if they ‘think there should be more 
or less of the EU budget spent on the following [three] areas’: ‘agricultural price 
support’; ‘scientific research and development’; and ‘support for refugees’. The 
questions allowed for five possible responses, coded 1-5; with preferences for ‘a lot 
more’ of a given policy, coded as 1; ‘a little more’ as 2; ‘about the same’ as 3; ‘a little 
less’ as 4; and ‘a lot less’ as 5.  
                                            
33
 This may suggests that MEPs who turn-up to vote less often are also less likely to reply to surveys, 
which of course has implications for survey data in general. 
34
 MEP responses for the 7th Parliament have been rescaled, as in this instance respondents were asked 
to place themselves on an 11 point scale (1-11).    
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Parliament Dummies: for the 7th and 6th parliament, with the 5th parliament as the 
reference category. 
Member State Dummies: for the four largest member states; Germany, France, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom. 
 
4.6 Specification 
Each of the nine interest-specific dependent variables is tested in one general model 
specification, which is subsequently constrained by membership of the two largest 
party groups. Because the dependent variable is effectively a count of the number of 
times an MEP has been lobbied, the equation is fitted following a Poisson distribution 
of the form: 
ln = 
 +  ∗  +  ∗  +             
                                ∗  +  ∗  !/#ℎ + % ∗  +               (1) 
                         & ∗ ' + ( ∗  ) + * ∗ # + + ∗   +                              
                              , ∗ 6ℎ    +  ∗ 7ℎ    +  ∗ # + 
 ∗    +  ∗ ! + % ∗ / + 0 
For ∀ 2 = 1, … ,9 
Where:                   Pr9: , ; =
<= >?@AB CD (FAB )
@HI
FHI!
           For ∀ 2 = 1, … ,9         
Testing for over-dispersion in each of the models (Ho: ; = 1), the results 
suggest that the model under-fits the amount of dispersion in lobbying for all 
categories. As a result it is appropriate to adopt the negative binomial model 
specification. In the case of some categories, there are also a significant number of 
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zero counts.35 For these categories, a zero inflated negative binomial specification is 
used, where the count outcome is weighted by the probability of that count being 
zero.36 The first model specification measures responses for each of the nine interest 
categories using a negative binomial specification with bootstrapped standard errors. 
The second and third model specifications include all explanatory variables except the 
party groups, but are constrained respectively by membership of the EPP (2nd model) 
and PES (3rd model). This enables the effect of interest group lobbying of non-natural 
allies (and allies) to be assessed given that of the three dominant party groups, the EPP 
and PES occupy the most clearly contrasting positions on the dominant left/right 
political dimension. This distinction is replicated amongst the population of interest 
groups through the same simplifying assumption introduced earlier, that the five 
producer interests (agriculture, industry, transport, trade, and banking & insurance) are 
likely to be allied more closely to the EPP, and are therefore non-natural allies of the 
PES. This logic is then applied to the four civil societal interests (environment, human 
rights, gender, and consumer interests), with the expectation that their interest are more 
closely aligned with the PES. 
                                            
35
 For each category, these are: Environment: 9.8%; Transport: 16%; Economic and Monetary Affairs: 
15.5%; Consumer Affairs: 8%; Agriculture and Fisheries: 17.3%; Women: 7.6%; Industry: 18.7%; 
Trade: 12.7%; Human Rights: 16.4%.  
36
 A Vuong test is used to compare the zero inflated negative binomial with the negative binomial 
baseline specification (see Long and Freese 2006 and Greene 1994) 
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4.7 Results 
The EP’s institutional rules and party group seat share define much of the opportunity 
structure for MEPs to become influential. As a consequence these constraints coupled 
with interest groups’ ideological alignment determine the strategic nature of lobbying 
behaviour. This section tests the ideas presented thus far, first in the committee setting, 
followed by the effects of party group membership.  
4.71 Committee rules 
To assess the first hypothesis, that Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that 
are members of a committee with responsibility for their area of policy concern than 
non-members (H1), the results for the committee membership dummy variable reported 
in model 1 (Table 4.2) are assessed. The coefficients for all 9 committees are in the 
expected direction, and significant at the .01 level. This can be interpreted as the effect 
of committee membership in the committee with responsibility for consumer policy, 
for example, is to increase the expected number of consumer group lobbying contacts 
by 176.2 percentage points (%), holding all other variables constant.37  
 However, regardless of the apparent uncertainty in the interest group literature, 
this finding should not surprise us. We know interest groups are attracted to the locus 
of political power, and research on decision-making in the EP has attributed a 
privileged and even dominant position to its committee system. Nevertheless, the 
strength of the association makes clear that the delegation of legislative power by the 
                                            
37
 The percentage figures, as reported in models 1, 2 and 3, are derived from exponentialβ. In this 
example a factor change of 2.762 = 176.2 percentage points, holding all other variables constant.    
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plenary has had a considerable impact on interest group strategic behaviour. The next 
step is to assess whether this logic extends and is applied within committee.      
The temporary office of rapporteur is generally considered to be the most 
influential position within committee. In order to determine the extent to which 
interest groups’ principal lobbying target is the rapporteur (H2), the explanatory 
variable rapporteur is considered for each committee. Here the results for seven of the 
nine committees are significant at the .1 level and in the direction anticipated, lending 
reasonable support to the hypothesis. Holding all other variables constant the effect of 
each report that a committee member writes is to increase the expected number of 
lobbying contacts by a policy relevant interest group by between 13.1% 
(environmental groups) and 100.6% (women’s organisations). This indicates that 
interest groups apply the same operating logic that they apply to targeting MEPs from 
relevant committees, within committee. They are attracted to the strong signal of 
legislative influence that the office of rapporteur appears to provide.38   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
38
 It would have been ideal to also assess the effect of Committee Chair on lobbying behaviour. 
However, the number of observations per committee was too low to report.  
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Table 4.2  Model 1: Explaining interest group contacts with MEPs 
 
 
 
  
               
Independent Variables Environ 
Groups 
Human 
rights 
Groups 
Women's 
Organis- 
ations 
Consumer 
Groups 
Agriculture 
Fisheries 
Groups 
Banking & 
Insurance 
Groups 
Industrial 
Organis- 
ations 
Trade & 
Commerce 
Associations 
Transport 
Groups 
               
Civil Societal Interests 
                            
Producer Interests 
Specification 
NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG 
Zero Inflated 
NBREG  NBREG 
Zero Inflated 
NBREG NBREG NBREG 
Committee membership 1.24*** 1.29*** 1.98*** 1.02*** 1.49*** 1.29*** 0.97*** 1.50*** 1.42*** 
246% 262.4% 623.7% 176.2% 344.2% 263% 164.4% 347.8% 314.3% 
 (0.123) (0.161) (0.264) (0.178) (0.153) (0.279) (0.133) (0.214) (0.227) 
Rapporteur 0.12** 0.22** 0.70* 0.13** -0.03 0.25** 0.24** 0.14 0.43*** 
13.1% 24.8% 100.6% 14.2% -3.2% 28.9% 26.9% 15.6% 54.1% 
(0.059) (0.093) (0.381) (0.064) (0.113) (0.103) (0.106) (0.135) (0.134) 
Participation 0.02*** 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 
1.5% 0.9% 0.3% 0.7% 0.9% 2.4% 0.5% 0.6% 1.1% 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.00) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Left/Right Self-Placement -0.11 -0.25*** -0.08* -0.07** 0.03 0.11** 0.60* 0.7** 0.07* 
-10.1% -22% -7.5% -6.8 3% 11.3% 6.1% 7% 7.7% 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.048) (0.310) (0.035) (0.04) (0.032) (0.034) (0.041) 
EPP 0.48*** 0.71*** 0.49** 0.62*** 0.29* 0.49** 0.43** 0.80*** 0.59*** 
61.2% 102.8% 63.6% 86% 33.2% 62.8% 54.4% 121.7% 80.5% 
(0.147) (0.19) (0.204) (0.142) (0.164) (0.180) (0.153) (0.160) (0.183) 
PES 0.17 0.35* 0.62** 0.34** 0.49** 0.60** 0.37** 0.57*** 0.65*** 
18% 42.2% 85.1% 40% 62.5% 81.8% 45.3% 76.1% 90.6% 
(0.151) (0.194) (0.222) (0.150) (0.178) (0.189) (0.156) (0.168) (0.189) 
ALDE 0.41** 1.15*** 0.45* 0.27* 0.44** 0.57** 0.39** 0.55** 0.31 
51% 214.2% 56.1% 30.6% 54.7% 77.2% 47.4% 73.2% 36.4% 
(0.165) (0.220) (0.232) (0.160) (0.190) (0.203) (0.166) (0.180) (0.205) 
GREENS 0.81*** 0.54 0.30 0.59** 0.59** 0.00 -0.01 -0.21 0.28 
123.7% 72.3% 35.5% 80.5% 79.8% 0% -1.2% 18.5% 31.9% 
(0.215) (0.314) (0.298) (0.209) (0.277) (0.277) (0.248) (0.25) (0.275) 
Policy Opinion -0.26*** -0.16** -0.35***    n/a -0.34    n/a -0.26***    n/a    n/a 
-13% -14.4% -29.2%    n/a -28.8%    n/a -23.3%    n/a    n/a 
(0.053) (0.057) (0.066)    n/a (0.052)    n/a (0.051)    n/a    n/a 
Parliament: compare 6th/5th 0.12 0.12    n/a -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.01 0.24** 0.21 
(0.109) (0.141)    n/a (0.106) (0.125) (0.135) (0.110) (0.120) (0.137) 
Parliament: compare 7th/5th 0.04 -0.01 -0.23* 0.03 -0.19 -0.04 -0.3 0.28** 0.11 
[Note: Women org: compare 7th/6th] (0.119) (0.158) (0.131) (0.118) (0.138) (0.146) (0.119) (0.132) (0.153) 
Germany 0.05 -0.20 -0.29 0.04 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.42** -0.08 
(0.141) (0.179) (0.204) (0.136) (0.172) (0.173) (0.144) (0.154) (0.183) 
France 0.09 0.17 0.08 -0.21 0.16 0.12* -0.19 0.06 0.07 
(0.165) (0.212) (0.230) (0.154) (0.186) (0.207) (0.165) (0.179) 0.201 
Italy 0.3** 0.24 0.55** 0.57*** 0.14 0.52** 0.38** 0.32** 0.77*** 
(0.146) (0.19) (0.201) (0.142) (0.165) (0.180) 0.143) (0.162) (0.183) 
United Kingdom 0.50*** 0.58** 0.24 0.42** 0.50*** 0.34** 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.63*** 
(0.141) (0.188) (0.216) (0.137) (0.158) (0.170) (0.139) (0.154) (0.175) 
Number of Observations 560 471 358 578 543 583 552 572 577 
Log-likelihood -2000.42 -1378.40 -1095.17 -2022.83 -1682.65 -1689.68 -1959.42 -1849.51 -1725.50 
Test for overdispersion: 
 
χ2 = 5120.02*** 2909.34*** 2207.42*** 4417.28*** 3611.19*** 3712.2*** 4735.49*** 4470.08*** 3811.82*** 
Vuong Statistic (Zero inflated) z = 1.07 z =  1.08 z = 0.82 z = 1.23 z = 2.38** z =  2.35 z = 1.53* z = 1.56 z = 2.02 
Notes: ***significant at 0.01 level, **significant at 0.05 level, *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Percentage change in the dependent variables (discussed), for of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (derived from expβ), 
in  
in italics . 
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In contrast to the opportunities to be influential that are derived from holding 
formal committee roles within the EP, a more opaque measure of potential influence is 
provided by MEPs’ relative level of legislative activity. To take account of this 
activity, interest groups require a particularly nuanced grasp of every-day decision-
making in the EP. The explanatory variable that measures participation in plenary is 
used to assess the extent to which interest groups are more likely to lobby committee 
members that are active in parliament (H4). The results presented in the first model 
lend support for the hypotheses from among seven of the nine interest groupings at the 
.1 level of significance. For a 1% increase in an MEPs attendance at a roll-call vote, 
their likelihood of being lobbied increases by between 1% and 2%. This level of 
increase is substantial when put in the context of the 12% to 100% range in MEP’s 
level of attendance (mean = 80.2).  
Predicted counts for H1, H2 and H4 are projected in Figure 4.3, for four 
categories of reported interest group lobbying. The values for rapporteur are set to their 
median, with party group as EPP, and Germany as large country. All other values are 
set to their mean. The graphs are consistent with the analysis completed thus far. 
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Figure 4.3  Predicted lobbying counts for rapporteurs, relevant committee 
membership, across participation in the plenary 
 
 
 
           To test the related hypothesis that interest groups lobby the rapporteur even 
when she is not a natural ally (H3), the variable rapporteur is again assessed but this 
time only in response to non-natural allies (model 2). The model is constrained by the 
corresponding party group. Hence the lobbying activities of civil society interests (4 
categories) are reported only for members of the EPP. Similarly, the lobbying activities 
of producer interests (5 categories) are reported only for members of the PES. The 
results for eight of the nine relevant categories are in the anticipated direction, with 
agriculture/fishing groups as the outlier. The results for the four committees with 
significant results lend support to the expectation that even when a rapporteur is from a 
party that is a non-natural ally to an interest group, they are lobbied more than their 
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colleagues by between 24.3% (banking/insurance lobbying of PES rapporteurs) and 
92.3% (transport groups lobbying of PES rapporteurs), for each additional report they 
write holding all other variables constant. Within these committees, the substantive 
effect of lobbying rapporteurs that are non-natural allies is comparable to the effect for 
the whole population (model 1) with respect to the five significant findings. 
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Table 4.3  Model 2: Explaining interest group contacts with party groups that are not  
natural allies 
 
 
 
 
 
               
Independent Variables Environ 
Groups 
Human 
rights 
Groups 
Women's 
Organis- 
ations 
Consumer 
Groups 
Agriculture 
Fisheries 
Groups 
Banking & 
Insurance 
Groups 
Industrial 
Organis- 
ations 
Trade & 
Commerce 
Associations 
Transport 
Groups 
   
EPP Lobbying by 
 
Civil Societal Interests 
              
 
PES Lobbying by Producer Interests 
Specification Zero Inflated 
NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG 
Zero Inflated 
NBREG  NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG 
Committee membership 1.00*** 0.90*** 2.08*** 0.73** 1.47*** 1.33*** 1.07*** 1.29*** 1.23** 
171.9% 145.5% 702.9% 108.4% 336.70% 279.1% 191.2% 261.80% 242.7% 
(0.374) (0.252) (0.356) (0.352) (0.318) (0.510) (0.249) (0.459) (0.433) 
Rapporteur 0.12 0.42** 0.30 0.10* -0.13 0.22* 0.11 0.10 0.65** 
12.4% 51.9% 34.8% 11% -12.2% 24.3% 12.1% 10.2% 92.3% 
(0.099) (0.165) (0.171) (0.050) (0.135) (0.121) (0.125) (0.186) (0.303) 
Participation 0.01* 0.01* -0.01 0.02** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 
1% 1.3% -0.6 1.6% 1.3% 1.8% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2% 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
L/RSelf-Placement -0.23*** -0.41*** -0.29*** -0.21*** 0.17* 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.29*** 0.17* 
-20.8% -33.9% -24.8% -19.3% 18.1% 67.5% 59.5% 33.6% 18.2% 
(0.072) (0.077) (0.940) (0.071) (0.081) (0.115) (0.086) (0.103) (0.085) 
Policy Opinion -0.32*** -0.35*** -0.37***     n/a -0.31***     n/a -0.46***     n/a     n/a 
-27.5% -29.8% -30.7%     n/a -26.8     n/a -37%     n/a     n/a 
(0.087) (0.083) (0.097)     n/a (0.106)     n/a (0.124)     n/a     n/a 
Parliament: compare 6th/5th 0.44** 0.61***     n/a -0.07 0.31 -0.27 -0.03 0.47** 0.07 
(0.188) (0.218)     n/a (0.185) (0.268) (0.235) (0.195) (0.235) (0.262) 
Parliament: compare 7th/5th  0.27 0.30 0.51** 0.16 0.16 -0.24 -0.01 0.29 0.33 
[Note: Women org: compare 7th/6th] (0.209) (0.257) (0.218) (0.209) (0.271) (0.248) (0.209) (0.244) (0.292) 
Germany -0.04 -0.09 -0.72** -0.02 0.42 0.14 0.26 1.01*** -0.33 
(0.204) (0.243) (0.307) (0.204) (0.396) (0.305) (0.277) (0.312) (0.375) 
France 0.21 0.28 0.22 0.44 0.40 -0.03 -0.17 0.57** 0.24 
(0.333) (0.373) (0.424) (0.332) (0.298) (0.314) (0.248) (0.290) (0.341) 
Italy 0.02 0.23 0.54* 0.72*** 0.67** 0.57 -0.12 0.66** 0.27 
(0.226) (0.254) (0.303) (0.230) (0.359) (0.349) (0.291) (0.336) (0.383) 
United Kingdom 0.81*** 1.27*** 1.06** 0.61** 0.75** 0.16 0.63** 0.93*** 0.64* 
(0.268) (0.314) (0.467) (0.265) (0.325) (0.318) (0.253) (0.303) (0.354) 
Number of Observations 194 173 116 198 160 171 164 167 170 
Log-likelihood -663.72 -460.61 -332.67 -719.11 -467.34 -484.11 -560.79 -517.50 -505.13 
Test for overdispersion: 
  
χ 2 = 1518.65*** 480.69*** 416.44*** 1655.3*** 1000.27*** 969.75*** 946.66*** 959.73*** 1157.47*** 
Vuong Statistic (Zero inflated) z = 1.94** z =  0.78 z = 0.91 z = 0.85 z =  1.64* z =  0.97 z = 1.28 z = 1.02 z = 0.87 
Notes: ***significant at 0.01 level, **significant at 0.05 level, *significant at 0.1 level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Percentage change in the dependent variables (discussed), for of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (derived from expβ), in italics . 
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4.8 European Party Groups 
The initial party group hypothesis is that MEPs from the three dominant party groups 
are lobbied more often than members from other party families (H5). This is assessed 
through the first model specification (Table 4.2). The results lend considerable but 
qualified support to the theoretically derived claim. If we first consider the results for 
the EPP (all significant at 0.1 level), when holding all other variables constant, party 
members are more likely to be lobbied than non-members by between 33.2% 
(agriculture & fisheries groups) and 121.7% (trade & commerce associations). A 
similar pattern is reported for the PES, with significant results found for eight of the 
nine categories of interest groups, with the expected increase in reported lobbying 
contacts ranging from 40% (consumer) to 90.6% (transport). This effect is also closely 
replicated for the liberals (ALDE). Again significant results are found for eight of the 
nine categories of interest groups, indicating an increase in lobbying of party members 
ranging from 30.6% (consumer groups) to 214.2% (human rights groups). 
However, what was unanticipated by the theoretical framework is the strong 
focal point provided by the Green Party for environmental lobbyists. In retrospect this 
seems unsurprising and indicative of the Green Party’s strength in this policy field. 
The Green party also appears to draw attention from agriculture/fisheries groups and 
consumer groups. Perhaps most interestingly, the results suggest that in the policy 
areas where the Green Party receives significant lobbying attention, the PES in 
comparison to other policy areas appears to be somewhat less favoured. This may be 
indicative of a reallocation of the portion of lobbying attention that is directed to 
‘friendly’ left of centre parties. 
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Predicted lobbying counts for four categories of interest are displayed in Figure 
4.4. They are for the corresponding committee member, non-rapporteur, with large 
country set to Germany and all other values held at their mean.  
 
Figure 4.4  Predicted lobbying counts across party membership  
 
 
The illustrations provided in Figure 4.4 make it clear that the underlying 
assumption that interest groups prefer to lobby their friends holds. For example, with 
reference to the left/right self-placement scores (x-axis), the intensity of both 
banking/insurance and transport lobbying increases as MEPs move away from the left 
side of the ideological spectrum. The mirror-image of this effect can be observed for 
environmental and consumer groups. This picture is provided for all groups in Table 
|
Other
|
ALDE
PES
|
|
EPP
|
Green
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Lo
bb
yin
g 
Co
u
n
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Left / Right
Banking & Insurance Group Lobbying
|
Other
Green
|PES|
ALDE
EPP|
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Lo
bb
yin
g 
Co
u
n
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Left / Right
Consumer Group Lobbying
|
Other
ALDE
PES
|
EPP|
|
Green
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Lo
bb
yin
g 
Co
u
n
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Left / Right
Transport Group Lobbying
|
Other
EPP|
|
PES
ALDE
Green|
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Lo
bb
yin
g 
Co
u
n
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Left / Right
Environmental Group Lobbying
118 
 
4.2 (model 1), which makes clear that the observable behaviour does not exhibit a 
central tendency.  
The predicted counts along with a corresponding baseline and confidence 
intervals for the three largest party groups are presented in Table 4.4. The table also 
includes the same comparative information for committee membership and for the 
office of rapporteur, across four categories of interest group. All other variables are set 
to their mean.   
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Table 4.4  Predicted counts with confidence intervals for committee member, 
rapporteur and dominant party groups 
 
 
 
The expectation for the final hypothesis is that when interest groups attempt to 
influence dominant party groups that are naturally less supportive, they lobby those 
members with relatively close policy preferences (H6). The same approach that was 
taken to assess the lobbying of rapporteurs irrespective of their policy preferences is 
again adopted, but in this case with reference to the party specific (PES or EPP) 
left/right self-placement variable. Here the results for all nine committees are 
significant and in the anticipated party contingent direction. As such, holding all other 
Independent Variable Predicted Contacts     Confidence Intervals 95%
No Yes No Yes
Banking & Insurance groups 
Committee Member 5.57 20.47 4.90,   6.24 10.23,   30.70 
Rapporteur 19.46 40.92 9.13,   29.79 25.21,   56.63
EPP member 5.31 8.81 4.45,   6.17 6.58,   11.01
PES member 5.28 9.71 4.46,   6.09 6.99,   12.44
ALDE member 5.81 10.23 5.09,   6.52 6.67,   13.84
Transport Groups
Committee Member 6.08 24.75 5.37,   6.80 14.50,   35.01
Rapporteur 15.46 40.92 7.13,   23.79 25.21,   56.63
EPP member 5.8 10.22 4.85,   6.75 7.58,   12.86
PES member 5.82 11.03 4.92,   6.72 7.96,   14.11
ALDE member 6.69 9.27 5.86,   7.52 5.96,   12.57
Consumer Groups
Committee Member 10.34 28.87 9.37,   11.31 19.69,   38,06
Rapporteur 20.52 42.09 11.08,   29.96 30.27,   53.92
EPP member 9.4 17.53 8.19,   10.61 14.04,   21.01
PES member 10.55 14.79 9.28,   11.83 11.49,   18.09
ALDE member 9.25 14.43 8.23,   10.26 10.40,   18.47
Human Rights Groups
Committee Member 5.01 17.84 4.45,   5.58 13.71.   21.97
Rapporteur 17.01 38.39 12.88,   21.15 22.71,   54.08
EPP member 4.97 10.33 4.19,   5.74 7.96,   12.70
PES member 5.9 8.56 5.08,   6.71 6.73,   10.90
ALDE member 5.54 16.35 4.92,   6.17 11.00,   21.70
                  Note: Rapporteur set to median values
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variables constant, a 1 place move to the right in an EPP member’s left/right self-
placement score (range 1-10) is associated with a decrease in lobbying by civil societal 
interest of between 19.3% (consumer groups) and 33.9% (human rights groups). In 
line with expectations, the inverse effect is observable for the relationship between 
PES members and producer interest. Here the percentage change in producer interest 
lobbying associated with a 1 point move to the right, ranges from 18.1% (agriculture & 
fisheries groups) to 67.5% (banking & insurance groups), holding all other variables 
constant. 
The predicted counts are graphed in Figure 4.5 for four categories of interest, 
with country values set to Germany, rapporteur at zero, and all others held at their 
means. The two producer interests (banking/insurance & transport) are placed on the 
left hand side to ease comparison with the lobbying of non-natural allies by civil 
society interests (environmental & consumer).  
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Figure 4.5  Predicted effects for lobbying unnatural allies and policy preferences 
 
 
The seemingly high level of support for hypothesis H6 on the party contingent 
left/right ideological dimension is also found through the alternative measure of MEP 
policy positions. The effect of the five policy opinion variables are tested through 
model 2 (Table 4.3). Here EPP members’ opinions on civil societal issues are assessed 
(environmental, discrimination and refugee), along with PES members’ positions in 
respect to producer interests (agriculture and research & development). The results for 
all five party contingent policy opinion variables were found to be significant and in 
the anticipated direction. That is to say, as the self-defined policy score of members of 
a relatively unfriendly large party group increases, i.e. their desire for more of the 
related policy decreases; they are less likely to be lobbied by associated interests. For 
example, the likely effect of an EPP member’s one unit decrease in support for 
Member of Transport Committee|
Non-Committee Member0
10
20
30
40
Pr
e
di
ct
ed
 
Lo
bb
yi
n
g 
Co
u
n
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
Left / Right
PES Members / Transport Group Lobbying
- Member of Consumer Committee
|
Non-Committee Member
0
10
20
30
40
Pr
e
di
ct
ed
 
Lo
bb
yi
n
g 
Co
u
n
t
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Left / Right
EPP Members / Consumer Group Lobbying
Member of Econ/Monetary Committee -
|
Non-Committee Member0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Pr
e
di
ct
ed
 
Lo
bb
yi
n
g 
Co
u
n
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 
Left / Right
PES Members / Banking & Insurance Lobbying
- Member of Environment Committee
Non-Committee Member|
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Pr
e
di
ct
ed
 
Lo
bb
yi
n
g 
Co
u
n
t
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Left / Right
EPP Members / Environmental Group Lobbying
122 
 
environmental protection standards (1-5 scale) is to decrease environmental groups’ 
lobbying by 27.5%, holding all other variables constant. A similar magnitude of effect 
is observable for a PES member’s position on agricultural support with respect to 
lobbying by agricultural (and fishing) interests.     
  
4.9 Discussion 
The analysis has addressed several key areas of uncertainty in our understanding of 
what determines which interactions take place between MEPs and interest groups. 
Fundamental to the explanation is the significance of the EPs institutional rules for the 
distribution of legislative influence, and hence on interest groups’ strategic behaviour. 
Three key drivers in this process are identified: increasingly cohesive European party 
groups; non-permanent winning coalitions; and the delegation of agenda-setting power 
to policy specific committees. The empirical examination of these ideas was conducted 
across the policy spectrum, which is in contrast to the more common practice of 
confining explanations to a sub-section of business interests. This has provided a 
relatively complete picture of lobbying behaviour in the EP, particularly given that the 
research is conducted across three parliaments.   
The relevance of committee membership to lobbying decisions has been 
clarified. In contrast to Eising’s (2007) findings, interest groups take full account of 
the institutionally imposed division of influence, differentiating between committee 
members and non-members within their policy sphere. What is more, it has been 
demonstrated that this same reasoning holds inside committees, with members that 
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take on the short-lived office of rapporteur receiving still greater lobbying attention 
than their less influential colleagues.  
These results show a much stronger linkage between committee membership 
and policy relevant interest group lobbying than had been indicated by Wessels’ 
(1999) broader typology. The reasons for this disparity probably lie in the timing of the 
research. Wessels’ study took place prior to the implementation of the Amsterdam 
Treaty (1st May, 1999), which, in addition to the well-documented growth in the EPs 
relative intra-institutional power, also had a profound effect on the relative inter-
institutional influence of EP committees. In particular, considerable formal and 
informal agenda-setting and negotiating authority has been transferred from the 
plenary to the committee level. Interest groups seeking to influence the EP’s legislative 
output will have quickly adapted their lobbying strategy to reflect these changes to the 
distribution of influence within the EP.  
The paper has also highlighted the dominant position of the European party 
groups which is compounded by the atypical nature of coalition formation. A winning 
coalition can and does frequently exclude either of the two largest party families but 
must include one or both of them. This creates uncertainty for both societal and 
producer interests as neither can be confident that the influential party that they most 
clearly identify with, and would ideally seek to persuade, will not be excluded from a 
winning coalition. As a consequence, a powerful incentive is created for interest 
groups to insure against this possibility, which means deviating from their otherwise 
optimal strategy of lobbying only natural allies and seeking at least a hearing from 
‘unfriendly’ yet potentially influential legislators.  
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However, evidence for this structurally induced behaviour does not falsify the 
primacy of the logic of ‘lobbying friends’ (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Kollman, 
1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998). The crucial insight is that when interest groups 
lobby MEPs from large influential political groups that are non-natural allies, they 
seek out legislators that are the most closely aligned from the population of 
unsupportive party group members. 
These findings may well have implications for interest group behaviour in 
national parliaments, although a different pattern of lobbying is anticipated. The key 
distinction is that in the national setting winning coalitions are generally stable owing 
to the presence of a permanent governing majority.39 Therefore interest groups for 
whom at least one governing party is an ally will have little or no incentive to lobby 
opposition parties. In contrast those IGs that are aligned with a party in opposition will 
have a strong incentive to build relationships with governing parties. Therefore in the 
national context an asymmetric version of that shown for the EP is anticipated, one 
that flips in line with clear changes in government and opposition. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
39
 In most national parliaments, individual MPs are far less lobbied than their counterparts in the EP. 
This situation is largely because of government dominance, but it is also as a consequence of generally 
weaker committee systems. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that organised interests’ choice of lobbying target is 
significantly determined by the distribution of legislative influence. The theoretical 
contribution has been to explain the dynamic relationship between MEPs’ political 
opportunity structure and the strategic actions of organised interests, but also to define 
the limits to this otherwise causal relationship.  
Each of the three papers has contributed empirically, theoretically and 
normatively to our understanding of interest representation in the EP. These 
contributions are summarised in this concluding discussion, along with an assessment 
of how future research might build on these findings. 
 
5.1 Empirical Findings 
The three papers in this thesis each provide a rigorous empirical examination of 
lobbying behaviour in the EP. The cogency of the findings has benefitted from the 
adoption of a range of methodological approaches incorporating new and improved 
measures of lobbying activity, through which hitherto unknown relationships between 
variables have been revealed. This has enabled certain existing assumptions to be 
challenged whilst providing evidence for a series of new theoretical insights.  
The literature makes clear that the EP is an increasingly important venue for 
interest representation. Yet there is limited discussion of when this activity occurs, 
whether certain legislators are targeted more than others, and if so, what characteristics 
might single them out. The foregoing empirical enquiries have made considerable 
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headway in overcoming this lacuna through a combination of in-depth committee 
analysis (paper one), as well as a large-n examination encompassing nine legislative 
committees (paper three). The analysis makes clear that the EP’s powerful legislative 
committees are the overwhelming focal point for organised interests’ policy demands. 
It is shown that organised interests aim to commence their EP lobbying with the 
rapporteur, at the initial draft report phase of the committee process.  
However, the results of an examination of amendments submitted by 
committee members, including the rapporteur, shed new light on the committee stage 
of the legislative process. They suggest that the open amendment phase of the 
committee process is at least as important a point of access for policy information to 
enter the EP’s decision-making process as the preceding draft report phase. Moreover, 
through a unique analysis of committee voting data, it is shown that open amendments 
submitted from the committee floor have a greater influence over the EP’s final 
legislative position (i.e. the report) than all amendments submitted by the rapporteur. It 
is also demonstrated that the distribution of ultimately ‘successful’ open amendments, 
and hence legislative influence, is skewed in favour of what has been defined as an 
informal committee elite. Additionally, it is suggested that the act of becoming 
influential, i.e. being part of this informal subset, is a natural pre-condition for holding 
office. Taken together these decision-making revelations have made a telling 
contribution to our understanding of legislative behaviour within the EP.  
The relevance of these insights for lobbyists’ strategic behaviour is firmly 
established through papers one and two. They each show that organised interests have 
a nuanced understanding of how legislative influence is distributed within the EP, and 
crucially, that this knowledge directly affects their decisions over which committee 
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member(s) to target. This is demonstrated in relation to the formal decision-making 
rules, i.e. membership of a relevant committee and the occupation of the transient 
office of rapporteur. However, it is also shown in relation to the outcome of MEPs’ 
private decisions to become actively involved in the decision-making process, i.e. 
where MEPs lie along a committee’s skewed distribution of legislative influence, and 
indeed the extent to which they participate more generally in the legislative activity of 
the parliament.  
The results also indicate that the ex-ante policy position of the rapporteur does 
not markedly affect his or her value as a lobbying target. Yet, when organised interests 
have an equivalent choice in lobbying target between an MEPs that has closely aligned 
policy preferences and one with opposing preferences they refrain from targeting the 
former. However, cross-cutting this preference is an apparent aversion to submitting 
poor quality information to influential legislators that have similar policy preferences 
to their own.   
A further set of findings connects the increasingly well-understood activities of 
European Party Groups with interest group behaviour (paper three). Here it is shown 
that in general, members of the four largest party groups report more lobbying 
attention than members of other party families. For the largest party group (EPP), this 
result holds across all nine categories of interest group that were analysed: It also holds 
for all bar one for the next two largest parties (PES and ALDE). In contrast, the appeal 
for the Greens (4th largest party group) appears less broad, and is apparently 
concentrated in those policy areas, specifically the environment, agriculture and 
fisheries, and consumer affairs, that are directly related to their political specialisation.  
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The results also confirm that organised interests display a strong tendency to 
lobby MEPs with policy preferences close to their own. Hence it was observed that as 
MEPs move to the right along an ideological spectrum, they report an increased 
number of contacts with producer interests. Conversely, a move to the left is associated 
with a greater level of lobbying contacts with civil society groups.  A similar effect 
was demonstrated when MEPs relative support for a given policy was assessed in 
conjunction with their level of interaction with associated interest groups. However, 
despite these results, an analysis of lobbying contacts with members of the EP’s two 
most dominant party groupings (EPP and PES) established that actively participating 
interest groups frequently lobby members from the party group that they are least 
aligned with. Yet when this activity occurs, it is those members within that group that 
nevertheless have relatively closely aligned policy preferences to the lobbyist that 
receive attention. 
The second paper explores a distinctive aspect of the relationship between 
rapporteurs and organised interests. This was achieved by introducing the committee 
secretariat as an intervening variable. The analysis showed that, commensurate with 
their role, rapporteurs rely on secretariat official(s) assigned to them in order to 
overcome legislative uncertainty, which stems from their need to evaluate a plethora of 
competing policy claims. It was also established that rapporteurs assume that the 
policy advice they receive from officials is at least relatively expert and independent. 
A further strand of the analysis focussed on the nature of secretariat officials’ 
expertise. Here it was found that lobbyists’ perception of officials’ policy expertise is 
lower than that perceived by the recipients of this knowledge, the rapporteur. In 
addition, it was found that committee administrators are intensively lobbied by both 
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the Commission and organised interests. However, the most actively engaged lobbyists 
appear to be pushing against an open door, as secretariat officials actively seek policy 
information from both Commission officials and participating organised interests. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Contributions 
The thesis has made a number of theoretical contributions to our understanding of 
organised interests’ strategic behaviour. Insights have been provided which directly 
connect the institutionally induced activities of MEPs with organised interests’ 
lobbying decisions. Theoretical contributions have been made to both the legislative 
and lobbying literatures on the EP. In so doing, an interface between what were two 
largely unrelated research tracks has been established. At the same time, our 
understanding of interest representation in the EP is placed firmly within, and 
contributes directly to, the wider literature on interest representation.  
Many of the arguments put forward in this thesis have been informed by the 
prevailing assumption that for strategic reasons organised interests have a strong 
preference for lobbying legislators that share their ex-ante policy preferences (Bauer, 
et al, 1963; Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 
1998). The point of departure was to identify and explain the limitations to this 
assumption. The initial insight was to place the underlying motivation for this activity 
into a wider context. This shows that organised interests are also motivated to lobby at 
the earliest point in the legislative process and to lobby those with the most influence 
over the policy outcome. As none of these assumptions are mutually exclusive, it 
follows that if they fall into conflict, a choice will have to be made. In the EP, the 
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institutional procedures and the system of coalition formation create conditions in 
which organised interests regularly face such a choice. These conditions are shown to 
be such that lobbyists frequently subordinate their preference for lobbying ‘friends’ to 
their otherwise compatible preferences to lobby those with most influence, at the 
earliest available opportunity.  
In paper one these ideas are explained in relation to the formal and informal 
rules that concentrate early stage agenda-setting power in the hands of a single 
rapporteur. Here the conditions to lobby early and to lobby an influential policy-maker 
are satisfied, but the chances of the rapporteur being an ally, and hence fulfilling the 
final condition, are uncertain. For the lobbyist, the costs of foregoing early access to an 
influential legislator are shown to be greater than those associated with lobbying a 
legislator with conflicting policy preferences. This outcome is further weighted in 
favour of lobbying a legislative foe because organised interests realise that rapporteurs 
have an incentive to include otherwise unacceptable submissions into their report in 
order to facilitate its passage through committee.  
The paper also explains how a change in committee rules, within the same 
committee process, provides lobbyists with a fresh set of choices. This is shown to be 
the case with the second open amendment phase, when the non-availability of 
legislative allies ceases to prompt a choice between otherwise optimal strategies. 
Instead, organised interests become constrained in their choice over which allies to 
lobby. Drawing on insights developed in the signalling literature (Berry, 1989; 
Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005), it is explained that although lobbyists have little 
choice but to submit their organisation’s policy information to a legislator, they 
nevertheless manage to avoid the reputational costs associated with providing poor 
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quality information. This is achieved by discriminating between their legislative allies 
on the basis of relative policy influence, and thereafter selectively delivering poorer 
quality information to less influential MEPs. This works because less influential 
legislators, who are necessarily engaged less in the policy process, do not care as much 
about the quality of the information as their actively engaged influential colleagues. As 
such the paper identifies the quality of the lobbying message as an intervening variable 
that limits the extent to which organised interests lobby their friends.   
The paper also provides additional theoretical insights into committee 
organisation. In common with information theories of legislative organisation (Gilligan 
and Krehbiel, 1987, 1989; Krehbiel, 1991), it is shown that committees have an 
interest in limiting the extent to which their policy decisions deviate from the position 
of the plenary. This is because as long as the plenary remains broadly satisfied with the 
policy positions taken by its legislative committees, it will continue to delegate to them 
the authority to make legislative agreements with the Council. It is the comparatively 
high level of policy specialisation of certain committee members that provides the 
mechanism to explain how committees’ inter-institutional negotiating position is kept 
in line with that of the plenary. The collective effect of small clusters of relatively 
expert committee members is to limit the possibility of their committee adopting 
technically deficient or explicitly biased amendments. It is because their reputation and 
knowledge is comparatively high that they are able to overcome, for example, 
lobbyists’ poor quality information submitted via less engaged committee members. 
As a further consequence of their reputation, it follows that legislative influence within 
the committee is skewed in favour of the more engaged MEPs. 
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The final paper presents a further limitation to the ‘lobbying your friends’ 
thesis, but like paper one it also provides an explanation for its resilience. A distinctive 
theoretical approach is adopted that takes account of party group behaviour, coalition 
formation, as well as the policy preferences of both party group members and 
organised interests. The catalyst for organised interests to deviate from their otherwise 
optimal strategy of lobbying legislators with similar ex-ante policy preferences to their 
own is provided by the fluidity of winning coalition formation. Since voting coalitions 
frequently exclude one of the two largest party groups, it is difficult for lobbyists to 
predict which leading party family will be on the winning side of a given vote. This 
provides a strong incentive for organised interests to make certain that their policy 
position is registered with both of the ideologically distinct dominant party families, 
thereby modifying their strategic approach.  
The additional theoretical insight provided by this paper is to show that 
organised interests’ hard-wired operating logic persists even when the strategic 
decision is taken to lobby members of an unfriendly party group. This is because 
organised interests continue to discriminate on the basis of policy preferences, but in 
this instance within the population of least aligned large party group members. Here 
they choose to lobby the most ideologically aligned MEPs from amongst an otherwise 
unfriendly party group.  
The second paper incorporates the same behavioural assumption, namely that 
organised interests prefer to lobby influential friends, but defines the limit of its utility 
rather than delineating the limits to its applicability. The explanation put forward is 
underpinned by a further assumption derived from the signalling literature. This is that 
legislators demand high quality policy information from closely aligned organised 
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interests in order to assess whether a particular policy prescription is consistent with 
their own policy stance. It is explained that this reciprocated demand, whilst sufficient 
for the requirements of ‘ordinary’ legislators, proves insufficient for rapporteurs to 
perform their altogether more complex agenda-setting task. Rapporteurs’ additional 
informational demand is for objective and independent policy expertise across a range 
of possible policy outcomes. This information is necessary to write a strategically 
advantageous draft legislative report. It is further explained that this requirement is a 
condition for the previously unspecified theory of indirect lobbying.   
The theory highlights the consequences for lobbying behaviour of committee 
rules that delegate early stage agenda-setting power to a single inadequately resourced 
committee member. The model that is developed reveals how rapporteurs come to rely 
on secretariat officials to fulfil their requirement for independent policy expertise. But, 
although permanent officials may seek to act independently, it turns out that their 
accumulation of policy expertise is endogenous to the lobbying process that 
rapporteurs seek to verify. Moreover, the information sources that officials rely upon 
are from amongst the more entrenched sections of the lobbying population. Prominent 
amongst these are members of the Commission and the national regulators of the larger 
member states, with the former taking additional advantage of the institutionally 
sanctioned revolving door, and the latter formally seconding members of their own 
staff to the secretariat. As a consequence, it is demonstrated that there is little 
opportunity for new and unbiased expert knowledge to reach the rapporteur via their 
most commonly used source of ‘independent’ information.     
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5.3 Normative Implications   
Collectively, the theoretical and empirical explanations of this thesis serve to increase 
our understanding of how lobbying behaviour is shaped in response to specific 
institutional rules and practices. As a consequence, a fuller and more dynamic picture 
of interest representation in the EP has emerged, giving rise to a number of normative 
implications for the legitimacy of decision-making in the EU.   
Here it is helpful to take Dahl’s (1961) concept of pluralism as a starting point 
for the discussion. Despite the real-world limitations of this approach (Olson, 1965), 
its normative value continues to have traction with commentators, regulators and 
political scientists. In this framework, organised interests and concerned citizens, 
which seek to directly influence political outcomes, are granted complete and open 
access to policy-makers, including politicians. Here it is supposed that unbiased 
policy-makers arbitrate between countervailing policy opinions on behalf of society.  
This aspiration directly affects how the Commission interacts with organised 
interests, as it is mindful that its legitimacy is substantially derived from a participatory 
conception of democracy. Hence the Commission actively seeks to redress the 
situation, originally highlighted by Olson, whereby concentrated producer interests are 
better able to mobilise than the diffuse interests of civil society. As a result, through 
the direct funding of certain NGOs and measures to increase the transparency of its 
interactions with societal interests, a form of what Lindblom (1977) called ‘neo-
pluralism’ has been created. However, it remains uncertain that pluralist countervailing 
pressures, induced or otherwise, can really have an impact within more technical 
policy fields (Greenwood, 2011). 
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The thesis offers insights into the extent to which countervailing policy 
pressures are prevalent within the EP. The empirics suggest that at the level of the 
individual legislator there is limited scope for neutral arbitration, given that organised 
interests predominantly seek and gain access to like-minded legislators. Where 
deviation from this principle was observed, it involved the ‘cherry picking’ of softer, 
relatively likeminded targets, i.e. the most friendly members of an otherwise 
unfriendly party. Nevertheless, the relatively open access that MEPs grant lobbyists 
suggests that the information they receive, while possibly biased, is unlikely to be 
derived solely from elites.  
This leaves the possibility that, at the aggregate level, decision-making may 
take place between countervailing interests via likeminded MEPs. Certainly, Hausemer 
(2006) suggests that the EP’s directly elected members have a strong incentive to take 
account of publicly salient issues. However, despite open access to decision-makers 
that together encompass a range of policy perspectives, the inference from the analysis 
is that this aspiration remains largely unfulfilled. If we take the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee, which featured prominently in paper one, none of the 65 
organised interests that were identified turned out to be representing the public good. 
This is in spite of a research design aimed at defining the entire population of actively 
participating interests. This is not to say that there was an absence of countervailing 
pressure. This was very evident, but it was exerted entirely from within the financial 
services sector, albeit from very distinct positions. Indeed, reflecting a seemingly 
widely acknowledged sentiment amongst MEPs, as well as Hausemer’s observation, 
the then committee Chair Pervenche Berès stated that “our role is to speak for the 
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ordinary citizen, which finds no other representation in our committee” (Interview, 1 
December 2008). 
 The voice of civil society may be absent because, as Greenwood observes 
within aspects of Commission policy-making, the technical bar is simply too high for 
these interests to overcome. This may be the case, particularly given that EP policy-
making is often considered to be of a more technical nature than that which takes place 
in national parliaments (Majone, 1996). But, in contrast to the Commission, the EP has 
taken much more modest neo-pluralist steps to redress the under-representation of civil 
society interests.  
The examination of the role of committee secretariat officials in policy-making 
has yielded additional normative implications for the pluralism of interest 
representation in the EP. These officials share many rules of operation with their 
bureaucratic colleagues in the Commission (i.e. desk officers), with staff regularly 
moving between institutions. However, it is the difference in how they fulfil their 
respective roles which is of particular interest. In comparison to bureaucrats in the 
Commission, secretariat officials are not encumbered by the same drive towards 
transparency in their actions, and are reluctant to engage with unfamiliar lobbyists. 
Similarly, in contrast to elected politicians, secretariat officials’ perception of their role 
does not include redressing the under-representation of civil societal interests.  
However, what makes this assessment of committee officials run counter to a 
pluralist conception of policy-making is the empirical analysis: this has shown that 
they are active participants in the legislative process. As such, the effect of their 
engagement with entrenched interests is to push EP policy-making further away from 
the pluralist ideal. Moreover, what amounts to a backdoor route to influence the policy 
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process is incompatible with recent attempts to monitor and indeed regulate lobbying 
behaviour with the EP.  
The analysis has also cast doubt on the extent to which the potential gains of 
introducing a 3-year staff rotation policy outweigh the pitfalls, particularly within 
specialised bureaucracies that have limited administrative capacity. Here it may be 
difficult to assess the extent to which bureaucratic capture has been reduced, or indeed 
to which it was a problem. But nevertheless the research has highlighted the need for 
future reform to take account of the hollowing out of bureaucratic capacity in terms of 
institutional memory and expertise. It is shown that such diminished capacity leads to a 
distinctive form of capture, partly by entrenched interests, but also as a consequence of 
a reliance on the policy expertise of experienced colleagues that are necessarily 
seconded national experts (SNEs). Indeed, this constellation of policy actors 
approximates a form of elite pluralism, particularly given that SNEs are often drawn 
from regulators and agencies of the more influential member states.  
However, these issues, whilst troubling for the legitimacy of policy-making, 
may in fact stem less from bureaucratic design than from the legislative rules that 
invest considerable authority in the rapporteur yet provide them with minimal 
resources for the task of assessing the large volume of policy information. Whilst this 
legislative approach is not unique, in comparison to a rapporteur in, say, the French 
Assemblée nationale, an office holder in the EP receives less support and is likely to 
deal with a more technical report.   
Through this focus on pluralism’s shortcomings, the extent to which interests 
representing the public good are at a disadvantage in the EP phase of the EU’s 
decision-making process is highlighted. Moreover, with reference to the on-going 
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debate over the EP’s alleged democratic deficit, this discussion not only has resonance 
for a participatory concept of democracy, but also for representative one. This is 
because, as Dahl suggests, there is a need for a constant supply of countervailing 
policy input in the space between elections in order to prevent elites or interests 
seeking private goods dominating the policy process. 
The committee system also serves to moderate policy outcomes through its 
informal system of informed scrutiny. Here requests for policy action that are either 
technically deficient or deviate significantly from the EP’s political centre are likely to 
be filtered away. As such, successful lobbying in the EP is not a ‘free for all’ in which 
lobbyists simply find a compliant MEP. Instead, it is rather a case of finding a 
competent MEP that is actively engaged in the relevant policy area. The implication 
here is that if an MEP chooses to specialise, and is a member of one of the larger 
dominant party groups, she can make a difference to certain legislative outcomes. This 
opportunity may be less likely to arise at the national level, unless the legislator 
happens to be from the government or governing party(s). Hence Nick Clegg noted, 
when asked to contrast his experience as an MEP with his then status as a UK 
backbencher, that “in the European Parliament I was able to make a difference to the 
way legislation was made. This isn’t the case in the House of Commons, and yet 
people now recognise me” (interview, 10.10.07). 
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5.4 Future Research   
The thesis has thrown up a number of avenues for future research. These concluding 
remarks simply sketch out the most prominent of these, both within the EP and in a 
comparative context.   
The analysis has made a modest contribution to our understanding of how 
organised interests’ strategic behaviour alters between distinct phases of the committee 
process. But what remains to be explored here is the extent to which the nature of the 
policy information that organised interests provide MEPs is affected by their success 
or failure, or indeed non-participation, at the Commission stage of the legislative 
process. Does this experience change the way arguments are framed and as a 
consequence affect lobbyists’ perception of which legislators might be friendly? Does 
the intensity or sincerity to which informational messages are delivered alter in 
response to previous activity? Answers to these questions would more directly link the 
interest group literature on the Commission with that on the EP. 
Explanations have been given for the role of European party groups in the 
lobbying process. These were long overdue given the breadth of understanding that we 
have on the prominent position that party groups occupy in the decision-making 
process. However, the research focus has not so far explained the equally pressing 
research question of the extent to which MEPs’ membership of their respective 
national party affects the interaction that takes place with organised interests.   
Furthermore, given that at the core of the thesis is an explanation of how 
decision-making rules affect lobbyists’ strategic behaviour, the next step is to apply the 
same theoretical approach across legislative settings. Here we should observe distinct 
forms of behaviour based on the interaction between lobbyists’ hard-wired operating 
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logic and variations in national political opportunity structures. A sense of how one 
aspect of this research might develop was provided in the final paper. Here the effect 
of party group membership on lobbyists’ strategic behaviour in the context of non-
permanent voting coalitions was highlighted for its relevance for research at the 
national level. This is because coalition formation in the EP appears to be at variance 
with that found within national parliaments, where a permanent governing voting 
majority is the norm. The suggestion from the analysis is that, in contrast to the EP, 
interest groups for whom at least one governing party is an ally will not have an 
incentive to lobby opposition parties. In contrast, interest groups that are allied to 
opposition parties will have an incentive to lobby governing parties.  
Finally, this thesis has shown that the strategic actions of organised interests 
are significantly determined by the institutional incentives that MEPs receive at 
different stages in the decision-making process; a finding that has important empirical 
and normative implications. Future research should continue to investigate how 
interest groups choose to carry out their lobbying and what effects this has on policy 
outputs and the nature of democracy. 
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Table A   Interest Group Rank
Most Influential MEPs: Number of Independent
Citations given by 52 Organised Interests
Name of MEP
No. of 
Independent 
Citations
KLINZ, Wolf 34
GAUZÈS, Jean-Paul 28
BOWLES, Sharon 22
PURVIS, John 19
RADWAN, Alexander 19
KAUPPI, Piia-Noora 18
BERÈS, Pervenche 13
van den BURG, Ieke 11
GOTTARDI, Donata 10
GARCÍA-MARGALLO Y MARFIL, José Manuel 8
HOPPENSTEDT, Karsten Friedrich 8
KARAS, Othmar 7
LULLING, Astrid 7
BECSEY, Zsolt László 5
FERREIRA, Elisa 5
STARKEVIČIŪTĖ, Margarita 5
ETTL, Harald 5
VISSER, Cornelis 5
PITELLA, Giovanni 4
GOEBBELS, Robert 3
MITCHELL, Gay 3
RYAN, Eoin 3
SÁNCHEZ PRESEDO, Antolín 3
SKINNER, Peter 3
EVANS, Jonathan 2
LAUK, Kurt Joachim 2
RAPKAY, Bernhard 2
WARTMANN-KOOL, Corien 2
BULLMANN, Udo 1
HÖKMARK, Gunnar 1
SCHMIDT, Olle 1
de VITS, Mia 1
LIPIETZ, Alain 1
Total 261
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